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This thesis attempts to answer the question, "Is War art or science?" In 
doing so it draws heavily upon Thomas Kuhn's "humanistic" philosophy of 
science. If "War" can be separated theoretically into two distinct analytical 
units, preparation for war, and conduct of war, then the answer to the 
question becomes more accessible. The war preparation process is notably 
similar to the Kuhnian dynamic of .. cientific process, i.e. , the evolution of a 
paradigm through inter-disciplinary criticism and rearticulation. A case 
study of post-WWII US nuclear strategy is offered to substantiate the claim that 
war preparation operates in a way that is remarkably similar to Kuhnian 
science. So, if war preparation is scientific, then the conduct of war, a 
fundamentally different activity, may be seen as artistic. This case is made by 
drawing heavily upon the writings of General Carl von Clausewitz, and the 
18th century German idealist Immanuel Kant. The end result of the work is to 
posit the existence of two types of men necessary for the execution of War, 
tho.;c who demonstrate ability in the sublime genius of science, and those who 
are more suited to develop the heroic genius of battle. The thesis suggests a 
reevaluation of U. s. military education as to its ability to identify and 
enhance the opportunities of these distinctive men within the armed forces. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
American strategists and warfighters are in the critical, perhaps terminal, 
stages of a nameless institutional disease characterized by intellectual sloth 
and functional entropy. Technology is revered as a demigod, scion of Physics 
and Man. Bureaucracy and administrative efficiency have supplanted passion 
and purpose as normative standard-bearers. No longer is the exploration of 
first principles considered important, let alone even considered. The situation 
is unfortunate, perhaps fatal. A group meets its demise when the ideas of that 
group become stagnant, although such a condition is often internally 
perceived and rationalized, as progressive. To reflect upon first principles is 
to purge the group and its product of superfluous doctrine, proced•ue and 
method, and to introduce new angles of approach to a given end. Such 
analysis will not inevitably lead to change, but will suggest possible existing 
flaws and option for solutions in the future. The result is not to further 
confuse, but to clarify, with the intent that clarification will lead to intensified 
focus. 
Philosophy is the oldest and most sublime of all disciplines. Its messages 
transcend all academic endeavours, from the heady metaphysical lessons of 
quantum mechanics, to the Hobbesian question of man's disposition in a "state 
of nature." To bring the tools of philosophy to the study of strategy and 
warfighting is nothing new. In fact, philosophy and war have a quite ancient 
------------------------------------------------------------------
tradition of intimacy. ran;ing from Plato, who asked if War is indeed an an 1, 
Aristotle, tutor of Alexander the Great, through the Stoic proclam~tions of 
Marcus Aurelius Antoninus, to the 19th century speculation of the Prussian, 
Carl von Clausewitz, a man deeply inspired, if not convinced, by the great 
German idealist metaphysical movement of his day. Protagoras and Kant 
similarly are key thinkers in understanding the fundamental issues of war, as 
will be demonstrated forthwith. 
While philosophical discourse is vigorous and robust in the modem 
American academy, it has all but died in the armed services. Many professors 
instructing the US officer corps introduce the basic principles. But only in 
rare circumstances are these lessons taken to nest by the students and 
developed individually, used as a st"rting block for funher reflection upon 
life and the officer's chosen profession of arms. This is not a result of any 
inability of the students to grasp the abstract ontological issues of pure 
thought. It is a result of the given condition in America that fundamental 
inquiry is considered unimportant. This rather shallow sociological 
orientation is a product of a dogmatic, bureaucratically imposed value system 
placed upon the students by the military, and by society as a whole, a value 
system embracing digital vice analog thinking, a system determined largely 
by a dangerous synthesis of the 17th century European Enlightenment and 
20th century American Pragmatism.2 
Plato, Rebublic, ed. and trans. B. Jowett, (New York, NY: Vintage Books), 67. 
2 Though it is beyond the scope of this paper, I believe a case could be made that the 
reason for a lack of a mandate for speculation in U. S. society as a whole is 
predominantly due to the Pragmatist movement of the early 20th century, as led by J. 
Dewey, W. James and C. S. Peirce. It is my belief that Pragmatism in America spelled 
the death of metaphysics and intellectual depth on a grand social scale. Pragmatism was 
2 
Carl von Clausewitz is without doubt the foremost thinker on War as a 
valid ontological subject. The Prussian died in 1831 and has left a legacy of 
profundity h his students in years since. Upon proper analysis, the reader of 
On War will be drawn to the centrality of man's role in war, from the exertion 
felt by the infantry soldier on the march to the genius of the commander in 
translating the chaos and uncertainty inherent in war into action and 
ultimately. victory. This notion of Man's predominance in the act of conflict 
is today wrongly seen as anachronistic. 
The focus of conflict in the present is myopic, upon Patriot missiles, 
Stealth fighters, and space-based rail guns. Technology. science, and 
operational analysis seem to reflect the essence of the modern military. Yet 
the question remains, "Is war a science, d0minated by contemplation, method, 
and technological offspring? Or is it an art, an endeavour placing prime 
emphasis on innovative a'ld creative action?" These questions have not been 
sufficiently answered by the defense-intellectual community. or the academy 
at large. Is war an art or science? To attempt an answer to this question is an 
exercise in first principles. a quest for essence. 
Whether the question is important enough to merit a response can be 
found upon review of the basic definitions used by today's military decision 
embraced by America and interpreted to mean that it could stop philosophizing. However, 
it is also my opinion that this condition does not ned to be so. As will be shown, 
Immanuc I Kant's metaphysics, a froreshadowing of American Pragmatism 120 years early, 
is central to my argument. 
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makers. One need only look at a few of these explications of "strategy," used to 
iJluminate the concept of "war", to see that the issue is muddy beyond reason.3 
For example, definitions of strategy include the following: 
Lexicon of Military Terms- A science, an an, or a plan (subject to revision) 
governing the raising, arming, and utilization of the military forces of a 
nation (or coalition) to the end that its interests will be efficiently promoted 
or secured against enemies, actual, potential, or merely presumed. 
Dictionary of United States Military Terms for Joint Usage- The an and science 
of developing and using political, economic, psychological and military forces 
as necessary during peace and war, to afford the maximum suppon to policies 
in order to increase the probabilities and favorable consequences of victory 
and to lessen the chances of defeat. 
Webster's Third New International Dictionary- The science and an of 
employing the political. economic, psychological and military forces of a 
nation or group of nations to afford the maximum suppon to adopted policies 
in peace or war. 
Soviet Milttary Strategy (V. D. Sokolovsky'- Military strategy is a system of 
scienti fie knowledge dealing with the l:.ws of war as an armed conflict in the 
name of definite class interests. Strategy- on the basis of military experience, 
military and political conditions, economic and moral potential of the country, 
3 All definitions taken from Edward N. Luttwak, Strategy. The Logic of War and Peace, 
~Cambridge MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1987), 240-241. 
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new means of combat, and the views and potential of the probable enemy-
studies the conditions and the nature of future war, the methods for its 
preparation and condu:;t, the services of the armed forces and the foundations 
for the material and technical support and leadership of the war and the 
armed f(,rces. At the same time, this is the area of the practical activity of the 
higher military and political leadership, of the supreme command, and of the 
higher headquarters, that pertains to the art of preparing a country and the 
armed for~..es for w~" and conducting the war. 
Introduction a la strategie (A. Beaufre)- the art of the dialectics of wills that 
Jse force to resolve their conflict. 
In the examples above "science" and "an·· are used cavalierly and seemingly, 
intcrch an ge ably. It is tragically unclear whether war (as seen through the 
lens of "strategy" defined) is an an QI. science, an art an..d. science, or some 
strange, special. and as yet undefined, hybrid of the two. It seems a natural 
response on the part of the conscientious strategic tLinker to attempt to 
clarify these terms so as to better, n ·re lucidly address his subject. 
Methodologically, the approach will be as simple as the rules of formal 
logic allo·:.. One of the most cor.1monly used syllogisms in basic argument is 
called modus to/lendo ponens, or, the disjunctive syllogism4, expressed 
symbolically as p v q, q, :. p, and verbally as "it is the case that either p or 
q, not q. therefore p. This syllogism, though simple, is extremely powerful. It 
should be :ntuitively obvious however, that few arguments fall cleanly into 
4 Ro"crt Paul Churchill, Becoming Logical: An lntroduc•'on to Logic, (New York, NY: 
Saint Martin ~ Press. 1986), 239. 
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this very specific logical fonn. Regardless, in the attempt to formulate an 
argument in this way, the thinker is forced to deal with the definitional 
uncertainties and ambiguities of the propositions in doing so. 
Fitting the subject matter of this paper into the disjunctive syllogism 
results in two possible outcomes: 
1. War is either an or science. War is no~ an. Therefore, war is science. 
2. War is either art or science. War is not science. Therefore, war is art. 
Another alternative exists in rejecting the syllogism outright. Same would 
argue that it is not possible to fit the question into a modus tollendo ponens 
form at all because the tenns used in the initial premise to classify "war," 
"art," and "science," are not mutually exclusive and as such cannot be set up as 
a disjunctive statement, that there is some sort of cognitive overlap in the 
terms, thus forcing the statement, "War is both art .il..D..d. science." 
'"War is art and science." Intuitively this statement seems more 
meaningful than either of the two initial disjunctive premises noted above. It 
is ludicrous to suggest that war contains no elements of either art or science, 
while it is reasonable to suggest that war is a subtle synthesis of the two. Yet 
the question still remains as to the specific ways in which war resembles art 
and science. The purpose of this paper then is to draw the lines of 
demarcation and intersection between art and science and then determine 
how and in what ways they are applicable to the study of war. It will analyze 
the "subtle synthesis" described above in hope that it will help guide future 
planners and military thinkers. 
The reader should have no doubt as to where this paper is leading him. 
This is certainly not a polemic; rather, it is a serious and personal response to 
6 
a perceived eclipse of Man's role in warfare, and on a larger scale, in life. 
This paper will not celebrate the revolutionary "state of the an" technologies 
used in modem war fighting, nor will it derogate them. It intends only to 
place them, and technology as a generic theoretical entity, in the proper 
perspective to Man. It will sketch separately science and an in war, and then 
explore the necessary coupling of the two in necessary terms of horse and 
cart. In doing this it will draw heavily upon the disciplines of philosophy of 
science, philosophy of an, and several works by strategic classicists led 
primarily by Carl von Clausewitz. 
7 
II. MODERN SCIENCE: THE TRIUMPH OF PROCESS OVER PRODUCT 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Without question, the single most important contribution to Philosophy of 
Science in the past 30 years is Thomas Kuhn's The Structure of Scientific 
Revolutions, originally published in 1962 as part of the Encyclopaedia of 
Unified Science. In this work, Kuhn describes the institution of science in a 
manner which boldly and refreshingly evades the questionably necessary 
positivist explications of the past, and in doing so he instigated a very lively 
debate throughout the philosophic community. In Structure, Kuhn discards 
the study of science as the comprehensive accumulation of discoveries and 
subsequent aggregation of these discretions under the rubric "Science" or 
"Truth." Instead he places science in a socio-historical context stressing 
process dynamics ~product jon in the form of a scientific corpus with some 
determinable epistemological status or even technology. This distinction is 
important for many reasons; and once science is accepted as process, not 





from distinguishing between science 
reason behind exploring Kuhn's 
and technology however, 
notion of science is to 
demonstrate the place of science in the martial equation. For, without doubt, 
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as alluded to in the introduction, science somehow plays a critical role in war, 
the question is, "How?" 
B. THEORETICAL CONSTRUCTION 
To answer this question properly, the idea of the "martial equation" must 
be examined further. By martial is meant "of war."5 To speak of the martial 
equation then, is ultimately to define war. As it is this paper's concern to 
explore the fundamental elements of war, it is sensible to use the definition of 
war as expounded by Clausewitz, perhaps the West's most fundamental thinker 
on the nature of war. For Clausewitz war is "an act of force to compel our 
enemy to do our will. "6 From this definition it is obvious that war is the "act" 
or the "doing" of force against the enemy. Unfortunately, given a 
symptomatic American tendency to consolidate entities, be they definitions or 
corporations, in the name of efficacy and at thr. expense of specificity and 
quality. War has come to be defined in terms of an overly broad range of 
subjects and disciplines. If this analysis is to continue smoothly, the the 
5 Oxford American Dictionary, (1980), s. v. "martial." 
6 Carl von Clausewitz, On War, trans. and ed. Michael Howard and Peter Paret 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), 75. This definition is a bit risky to 
use because it becomes subject to the frequently asked questions as to how war, as 
defined, is different from an anti-terrorist campaign as is taking place in Northern 
Ireland. or a police raid upon an urban drug den. Given Clausewitz' definition, all of the 
above would necessarily be classified as war. I have no problem with this assertion. As 
ultimately the paper will look at the centrality of Man in conflict, it makes little 
diffe1en~,;e from a theoretical view where the violence is taking place. In fact, as 
Clausewitz mentions, the principles of war can be illustrated by looking at the theoretical 
will and conduct of duelists or wrestlers. To get into a formalized taxonomy of conflict is 
unnecessary within the bounds of this paper, though useful, indeed imperative, for others. 
9 
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overly comprehensive conception of War, as used by contemporary military 
thinkers, must be explicated further. 
There are many facets of discourse within the so-called martial 
endeavour. These angles of inquiry pertain to the subjects of training, 
logistics, strategic planning, tactical doctrine, historical case studies, war 
gaming, weapons evaluation, etc. They are all fundamental to the analysis of 
war on an all encompassing macro-level, but the utility of thinking of war as 
a meaningful conceptual entity in terms of these discipline is limited. War is 
conflict. and it is the conduct of this special belligerent dialectic which should 
be addressed when discussing war. 
If war is the "conduct" of conflict, how then are the subjects discussed 
above installed within an analytic framework on War? After all, they are 
clearly important. They are important because they represent the potential 
leading up to the actual conduct. The martial endeavour then, War, can be 
broken down and isolated into two areas. 
Conduct of war. 
1. Preparation for war, and 2. 
This distinction will be shown as central in addressing the question of 
art and science in war. In fact, it is submitted that the dynamic of the 
scientific process is infinitely more congruent with the preparation for war, 
as opposed to the conduct of war Before making the connection between war 
preparation, an admittedly broad and potentially ambiguous category, and 
science, it ts first necessary to explicate the idea of science in a 
comprehensive manner. As alluded to previously, the thought of Thomas 
Kuhn will be the foundation of this analysis. In order to present him 
effectively it i-:: necessary to first review the state of the philosophy of science 
10 
against which he necessarily rebelled, for it is Kuhn's rebellion which speaks 
so well to the conditions of the day. Military thinkers would do well to 
understand Kuhn, and his view of science. 
C. THE INTELLECTUAL GENESIS OF KUHNIAN SCIENCE 
Philosophy 
development. 
of science as a formal 
Though implicit notions 
discipline is a fairly recent 
of science and its role in 
epistemological inquiry could be derived from most all philosophers, science 
was treated as a unique subject of exploration by philosophers beginning with 
John Stuart Mill (1806-1873) and William Whewell (1794-1866). These two men 
were fundamentally in opposition as Mill attempted to argue that the central 
problem in philosophy of science was to attribute some kind of meaning to 
independent facts of observation, and experimental process. For Whewell, a 
pseudo-Kantian, primacy was placed upon theory and the thinker and their 
roles as the drivers of scientific inquiry .1 
Mill is considered an inductivist. He believed in the prior status of facts 
and observation to theory. Not only did facts precede theory, all theory was 
developed inductively from fact. Scientists, for Mill, argued from the 
particular to the universal. They would observe a phenomena, and develop a 
theory to accommodate it. Inductivists are thus, reductionists. All theory is 
ultimately reduced to experience. This reductionist epistemology should be 
familiar. as it was articulated in a less specific, though very bold, manner by 
7 The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, s. v. "Philosophy of Science, History of," By R. Harr~. 
11 
David Hume (1711-1776) in An Inquiry Concerning Human Understanding. 
Ultimately, the reductionist approach to knowledge and science would give 
rise to one of the most important philosophical movements in the 20th 
century, logical positivism. 
Ian Hacking outlines the primary tenets of the positivist stance lucidly 
as he says, 
The key ideas are as follows: (1) An emphasis upon verification (or 
some variant such as falsification): Significant propositions are those 
whose truth or falsehood can be settled in some way. (2) P r o-
observation: What we can see, feel, touch, and the like, provides the best 
content or foundation for all the rest of our non- mathematical 
knowledge. (3) Anti -cause: There is no causality in nature, over and 
above the constancy with which events of one kind are followed by 
events of another kind. (4) Downplaying explanations; Explanations 
may help organize phenomena, but do not provide any deeper answer to 
Why questions except to say that the phenomena regularly occur in such 
and such a way. (5) Anti-theoretical entities: Positivists tend to be non 
realists, not only because they restrict reality to the observable but also 
because they are against causes and are dubious about explanations. They 
won't infer the existence of electrons from their causal effects because 
they reject cau~es, holding that there are only constant regularities 
between phenomena. (6) Positivists sum up items (1) to (5) by being 
against metaphysics. Untestable propositions, unobservable entities, 
causes, deep explanation-these, says the positivist are the stuff of 
metaphysics and must be put behind us.8 
The logical positivist movement was developed and championed by a 
philosophical discussion group which met periodically and called itself the 
Vienna Circle. It was led by Moritz Schlick, and its members included Rudolph 
Carnap, Herbert Feigl, and Kurt Gtidel among others. One of the most 
important products of the logical positivist movement for philosophy of 
8 Ian Hacking, Representing and Intervening: Introductory Topics in the Philosophy of 
Natural Science, (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 41-42. 
12 
science specifically, and epistemology in general, was what would come to be 
known as the Received View On Theories.9 
From 1910-1913, Bertrand Russell and Alfred North Whitehead were 
publishing their titanic Principia Mathematica in 3 volumes. Principia made 
a convincing case demonstrating that all mathematics could be done in tenns 
of logic, indeed that logic reflects the essence of mathematics. Mathematical 
statements of scientific laws, and definitions of theoretical terms could be 
given in terms of mathematical logic. I 0 This elegant proof, as articulated by 
Russell and Whitehead and absorbed by the Vienna Circle, was combined with 
the classic positivist tenets as outlined above to give birth to the received view. 
The basic articulation, which seems fairly rigorous at first glance, is sketched 
below. For the positivists, observation is tied to theory, and this act of bonding, 
and its logical consequences define science. 
The Received View constmed scientific theories as axiomatic theories 
formulated in a mathematical logic L meeting the following conditions: 
(i) The theory is formulated in a first-order mathematical logic with 
equality, L. 
(ii) The non-logical terms or constants of L are divided into three 
disjoint classes called vocabularies: 
9 The term, Received View, was introduced in Hilary Putnam's "What Theories Are Not" in 
Logic. Methodology. and Philosophy of Science: Proceedings of the 1960 International 
Congress, edited by Ernest Nagel, Patrick Suppes and Alfred Tarski, (Stanford, CA: 
Stanford University Press, 1962), 240-251. 
10 Frederick Suppe, The Structure of Scientific Theories, 2nd ed., Frederick Suppe ed. , 
(Chicago, IL: University of Illinois Press, 1977), 12. 
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(a) The logical vocabulary consisting of logical constants 
(including mathematical terms). 
(b) The observation vocabulary, V 0 , containing 
observation terms. 
(c) The theoretical vocabulary, V t• containing 
theoretical terms. 
(iii) The terms V 0 are interpreted as referring to directly observable 
physical objects or directly observable attributes of physical objects. 
(iv) There is a set of theoretical postulates T whose only nonlogical 
terms are from V t· 
(v) The terms in V 1 are given an explicit definition in terms of V 0 by 
correspondence rules C-that is, for every term 'F ' in V t• there must be 
given a definition for it of the following form: (x)(Fx Y Ox) [where ¥ = "if 
and only if'], where 'Ox' is an expression of L containing symbols only 
from V 0 and possibly the logical vocabulary .11 
For the purposes of this paper it is not necessary to grasp the entirety 
of the received view's meaning as applied to the rigors of formal logic.12 It is 
important however, to take from this discussion two broader points. First, the 
radical reductionism derived from Mill is evident. The rules above describe a 
system whereby the only allowable symbolization, apan from the analytic 
II Ibid. . I6. 
I2 It should be noted here that the received view as developed by the logical positivists 
and articulated by Putnam is no longer considered a tenable epistemological position. For 
reasons involving exceedingly rigorous issues of formal mathematic logic, which I judge to 
be beyond the scope of this paper, the received view's position has been weakened to the 
point of relative dismissal in the literature. The quasi-divine philosophical status of its 
progenitors, the Vienna Circle, Russell and Whitehead however has not changed in the 
lea~t. indeed, logical positivism is still a legitimate school. Only its applications to 
scientific theory have been defeated. It is because of this attack on the received view that 
other thinkers had the opportunity to explore more various angles of philosophic inquiry. 
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mathematical and logical meta-symbols is derived from some kind of 
observable phenomena. This can be seen in section (iii) of the received view 
above. All possible scientific knowledge is drawn from the immediately 
observable, V 0 . All theory, V t .. is accumulated directly from these V 0 • Second. 
the received view and its proponents are concerned with theory. They see 
theory as a product of science and the central focus of scientific inquiry. 
Though Sir Karl Popper and Rudolph Camap disagree as to the proper 
activities to conduct upon a theory once formulated, Popper promotes a 
falsificationist criteria while Carnap heralds a verificationist criteria, 1 3 they 
both agree that the theory, the product of science, is of primary imponance. 
Note that the positivist conception of theory is such ·that the role of the 
observer is all but ignored. The positivists see the act of observation as a kind 
of neutral exercise, unsullied by any mental "processing" by the mind. What 
is seen and symbolized in the positivist's first order calculus is aU rhar can be 
called "real." All theoretical terms are cognitively significant in the sense 
that they each satisfy the verification (or falsification, for Popper) criteria of 
meaningfulness. This is to say that something is considered meaningful if and 
only if it can be verified through observation. Ergo, all other notions, love, 
heroism, God, passion etc, are not observable in any positivist sense and are 
thus meaningless. 
As the Received view became increasingly weakened by repeated and 
rigorous attacks on its logical foundations, room opened up for other, radically 
different conceptions of science. Out of the entropic state of affairs, rose 
13 Hacking, Representing, 5. 
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Thomas Kuhn. Kuhn is the leader of what can be tenned the Weltanschauung 
(world-view) theorists.14 He, along with Toulmin, Bohm, and Hanson, best 
represent this school. It seems an appropriate label as all members of this 
school reject the pure focus on theory and instead believe that the broadly 
reaching world-view of the scientific community is an essential point of 
study. 
Hans Reichenbach, in 1938, introduced to philosophy of science the 
notions of "context of discovery" and "context of justification" to make the 
distinction between the way a scientific or mathematical result is discovered 
and the manner in which it is justified.15 It is within the bounds of this 
distinction that the Weltanschauung philosophers of science can best be 
addressed. 
The context of discovery, for Reichenbach, is the field of concern 
for, historians, psychologists and sociologists. It answers questions such 
as. Who made the discovery? When? Was it a lucky guess, an idea filched 
from a rival, or the pay-off for 20 years of ceaseless toil? Who paid for 
the research? What religious or social milieu helped or hindered this 
development? 16 
The context of justification however, is the realm of philosophy, epistemology 
and philosophy of science specifically. Knowledge as traditionally defined in 
14 Suppe, Structure of Scientific Theories, 125. 
15 Hans Reichenbach, Experience and Prediction, (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago 
Press. 1938), 6-7. 
16 Hacking, Representing, 6. 
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philosophy is "justified true belief," 17 and the question of how, within a 
coherent logical framework, a theory is justified, is the stuff of Knowledge. 
Now consider the finished end-product: an hypothesis, theory, or 
belief. Is it reasonable, supported by the evidence, confirmed by 
experiment, corroborated by stringent testing?l 8 
Philosophers were concerned with the finished product of theory, not the 
events and interactions which ultimately produced it. They would grant 
maximum importance upon the logical coherence of a theory in its completed 
stages. but not to the dynamics leading up to that completed form, i. e. , the 
modifications that inevitably occur to a theory as it is subject to various types 
of experimental tests. 
The Weltanschauung philosophers of science rebel against this view. 
For them, the process of science a science. 
Full epistemic understanding of scienrific theories could only be had 
by seeing the dynamics of theory development, the acceptance and 
rejection of theories, the choosing of which experiments to perform and 
so P To understand a theory was to understand its use and 
development. I 9 
In the tradition of Kant, the Weltanschauung adherents believe in, if not the 
subjectivity of truth, at least the subjectivity inherent in man's quest to 
substantiate it. 
17 Recollections of lectures by Professor Foster Tait, University of South Carolina 
Department of Philosophy, 1982-1986. 
18 Hacking, Representing, 6. 
19 Suppe, Structure of Scientific Theories, 126. Suppe holds that this view was 
convincingly presented by Wittgenstein in Philosophical Investigations, (Oxford, England: 
Blackwell, 1953). This is a bit odd as Wittgenstein is usually perceived as one of the most 
revolutionary thinkers on logical positivism as well. 
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This approach does not claim there is a unique set of categories 
determining the Weltanschauung, but rather allows that significantly 
different ones arc possible; it is committed, however, to there being 
certain distinctive features or characteristics of scientific 
Weltanschauung .2 0 
The following section on Thomas Kuhn specifically will attempt to elucidate 
these "distinctive features." It is the Kuhnian scientific dynamic which will 
be used in a case stu<iy to substantiate the claim that the scientific part of war 
is that of preparation prior to battle. 
D. KUHNIAN SCIENCE 
Thomas Kuhn began his career as a physicist and then changed paths and 
took on history and philosophy of science as his intellectual focus. As the 
positivists and th-: pseudo-positivists struggled to find the proper mode of 
justification so as to assert "truth," Kuhn. in the heat of a Kantian momcnt21, 
sa--a; that truth was far too elusive. He realized that the elusiveness of truth 
does not mnn something useful cannot be said of science, but only that the 
pseudo-positivist aim is likely off. To contrast Kuhn with his predecessors 
more concretely, Hacking makes the following assertions. 
20 Ibid. • 127. 
21 Kant in his various manifestations is a dissertation subject in himself. The sense in 
which I bring him into the discussion is basic. Simply, he showed, in his Critique of Pure 
Reason, that a "thing in itself", or noumena, cannot be known. Knowledge is a function of 
the intellect. The intellect transforms the noumena into phenomena, or, "thing as known." 
The intellect performs an operation on noumena whereby it places it through 1. time and 
space, and 2. the categories (Quantity, Qualily, Relation, Modality). The result is 
phenomena. which we. as humans. take as reaJity. Truth, noumena, can never be known. 
Kuhn realizes the necessity of man's role in the quest for truth, and thus it is that I use 
the phrase "Kantian moment." 
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Kuhn holds: 
-There is no sharp distinction between observation and theory. 
-Science is not cumulative. 
-A live science does not have a tight deductive structure. 
-Living scientific concepts are not panicularly precise. 
-Methodological unity of science is false: there are lots of 
disconnected tools used for various kinds of inquiry. 
-The sciences themselves are disunified. They are composed of a 
large number of only loosely overlapping little disciplines many of 
which in the course of time cannot even comprehend each other ... 
-The context of justification cannot be separated from the context of 
discovery. 
-Science is in time, and is essentially historicat.2 2 
Central to Kuhn's conception of science is his notion of paradigm. In 
Structures, he claims that the word, "paradigm," "figures more often than any 
other, excepting the grammatical particles .. .'•23 This is truly the case. In fact, 
"paradigm" was used so much that one Cambridge philosopher of language, 
Margaret Masterman, felt a need to check the word's coherence of mean:ng 
throughout the book. She found 21 different meanings for the word. They are 
presented here, in a condensed form so to give the reader an idea of the term's 
22 Hacking, Representing, 6. 
2J Thomas Kuhn. The Essential Tension: Selected Studies in Scientific Tradition and 
Change. (Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press, 197-:'), 293-94. 
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meaning(s) and also to make Kuhn's subsequent response, in which he 
clarifies the concept of paradigm, more cogent. Masterman submits, 
Thus he describes a paradigm: 
1. . .. a universally recognized scientific achievement... 
2. . .. a myth ... 
3. . .. a 'philosophy,' or constellation of questions ... 
4. . .. a textbook or classic work ... 
5. . .. a whole tradition, and in some sense, a model... 
6. . .. a scientific achievement ... 
7. . .. an analogy ... 
8. . .. a successful metaphysical speculation ... 
9. . .. an accepted device in common law ... 
10. . .. a source of tools ... 
11. . .. a standard illustration ... 
12. . .. a device, or type of instrumentation ... 
13. . .. an anomalous pack of cards ... 
14. . .. a machine tool factory ... 
15. . .. a gestalt figure which can be seen two ways ... 
16. . .. a set of political institutions ... 
17. . .. a 'standard' applied to quasi-metaphysics ... 
18. . .. an organizing principle which can govern perception itself ... 
19. . .. a general epistemological viewpoint... 
20. . .. a new way of seeing things ... 
21. ... something which defines a broad sweep of reality ... 2 4 
Kuhn's uses of the word, "paradigm" are far too broad in scope. But in 
response to Masterman he states, "Though neither the compiler of that index 
nor think the situation so desperate as those divergences suggest, 
clarification is obviously called for."2 5 
On the surface, a paradigm is a worldview, a Weltanschauung, a 
bounded intellectual environment as well as the conceptual and physical tools 
which define it. Even this quasi-definition is not satisfactory however for the 
24 Margaret Masterman, Critic;.'"' and the Growth of Knowledge, eds. Imre Lakatos and 
Alan Musgrave, (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1970), 63-65. 
25 Kuhn, Tensio'l, 294. 
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purposes of analyzing a specific case and testing its legitimacy as scientific (as 
will be done in Chapter Ill). Before going further into an operational 
e1.plication of "paradigm," it is useful to look at the nominal Kuhnian 
scientific process as described by Hacking. He calls it Kuhn's "tidy structure 
of revolution:" 1. Normal science--> 2. Crisis--> 3. Revolution--> 4. New 
normal science. 2 6 
Normal science is a routine process conducted within a fairly well-
defined intellectual and material atmosphere. This atmosphere, or 
environment, is what Kuhn characterizes as a paradigm. Occasionally, during 
the standard conduct of normal science, major problems arise which cannot 
be explained within the environment as it exists. A problem may arise that 
flies directly into the face of a theory which has to that point been accepted as 
valid and true. Or some new phenomenon may appear in the environment 
that, while n 1t refuting any theory directly, is so new and so dramatic, that 
existing theory is too limited to accept it. 
When such a novelty arises, and it cannot be fit into the existing state of 
the discipline, it is known as a crisis. When the discipline, be it physics, 
biology. nuclear strategic planning or, paleo-botanical morphology finds 
itself in a state of crisis, members of the community will do one of two things. 
They will 1. develop a new paradigm while they struggle to reconcile the new 
facts with new theory, or 2. stubbornly resist change and attempt to 
reinterpret or remeasure, or requalify, in the case of social science in 
general, the new facts so that they wi11 become congruent within the bounds 
26 Hacking, Representing, 7. 
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of the existing paradigm. Option (1) describes a revolution, and once this 
revolution is accepted by the scientific community as a whole, that community 
begins a new normal science. 
So. as shown in this brief review of the scientific process according to 
Kuhn, paradigm is a core concept. It defines normal science, breeds anomaly 
and crisis, causes revolution, and ultimately is redefined to start the process 
over. How then can the term be further explicated? Kuhn sees the word as 
having two distinct definitions. He sees paradigm t as a "disciplinary matrix," 
and paradigm2 as "exemplar." Both meanings are explored below. 
It is useful to study Kuhn's response to Masterman's criticism. In his 
essay "Second Thoughts On Paradigms," Kuhn states, 
In the book the term "paradigm" enters in close proximity, both 
physical and logical, to the phrase "scientific community." A paradigm is 
what the members of a scientific community, and they alone, share. 
Conversely, it is their possession of a common paradigm that constitutes a 
scientific community of a , group of otherwise disparate men.2 7 
Once again, it is imponant to reiterate two salient points. First, no conception 
of truth has entered into the discussion. No truth value judgements are being 
made in reference to the paradigm, or the theories contained therein. Second, 
Kuhn's focus, antithetical to the positivists, is upon the role of the social 
institution. the scientific community, in determining the rules of conduct 
within the paradigm, not determining truth, but determining the rules which 
guide the quest thereto. 
27 Kuhn, Tension, 294. 
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So, an analysis of the scientific community discloses a well trodden path 
into the abstract notion of the paradigm. Kuhn offers at least two passages 
which allow a firmer grasp on the relation of the paradigm to scientific 
communities and more specifically, to the disciplinary matrix. Initially in, 
Structures, he recognizes the connection, 
In the sciences, ... the formation of specialized journals, the 
foundation of specialists societies, and the claim for a special place in the 
curriculum have usually been associated with a group's first reception of 
a single paradigm.2 8 
In another response to Masterman, he gives the best definition to date, 
A scientific community consists, in this view, of the practitioners of a 
scientific specialty. Bound together by common elements in their 
education and apprenticeship, they see themselves and are seen by 
others as the men responsible for the pursuit of a set of shared goals, 
including the training of their successors. Such communities are 
characterized by the relative fullness of communication within the 
group and by the relative unammlty of the group's judgement in 
professional matters. To a remarkable extent the members of a given 
community will have absorbed the sane literature and drawn similar 
lessons from it.2 9 
This description of the scientific community allows a clean entrance into the 
idea of paradigm 1, or the disciplinary matrix. Kuhn selected this term 
because "disciplinary" implies the common possession of the practitioners of a 
professional discipline, and "matrix" because it is composed of elements of 
various sorts subject to further specification) 0 
28 Kuhn, Structures, 19. 
29 Kuhn, Tension, 296. 
30 Ibid. . 297. 
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Kuhn identifies three elements of the disciplinary matrix which are 
central to the cognitive operation of the group: symbolic generalizations, 
models, and exemplars. Symbolic generalizations represent broad 
relationships of concepts or groups of concepts, "those expressions deployed 
by the group, which can readily be cast in some logical form .... 3 1 In physics 
they are often found in symbolic form. For example, no one knows what 
matter is, but it has mass and the equation f=ma still has meaning. Another 
example would be I= VIR. Some symbolic generalizations are expressed in 
words such as "all cells come from cells," or "action equals reaction." Kuhn 
suggests that the power of a science increases with the number of symbolic 
generalizations it contains. 3 2 Models, for Kuhn, are preferred analogies, 
such as seeing an electric circuit as a steady state hydro-dynamic system for 
pedagogical and cognitive reasons. 
Exemplars, expanded upon below, are paradigm2, and are subsumed 
under the disciplinary matrix. Suppe describes the relationship between the 
disciplinary matrix and exemplars so, 
... disciplinary matrixes are acquired implicitly through the 
educational process whereby one comes to be a licensed practitioner of 
the scientific discipline. This implicit acquisition comes from the study of 
one portion of the disciplinary matrix which can be explicitly 
formulated, the exemplars.3 3 
31 Ibid. , 297. 
32 Ibid. , 298. 
33 Suppe. Structure, 139. 
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Still exemplars need to be defined. The Oxford American Dictionary 
defines the term as "a worthy model or pattern," or "a typical example ... 3 4 
Exemplars are parts of the intellectual development of those in the discipline. 
They are the examples that may be given by professors in the most basic and 
introductory courses that act as guides for the application of further theory to 
nature. Suppe states it as follows, 
As a student one studies textbooks which include examples 
exemplifying the ways the science's symbolic generalizations (the so-
caJled Jaws of theories) apply to phenomena; and in working textbook 
and laboratory exercises, he encounters still further examples 
exemplifying the ways the science applies or attaches its symbolic 
generalizations to nature. Later in his development he encounters 
still further examples while doing supervised research; and ultimately in 
his professional career, various journal articles, research reports, and so 
on, supply him with still further examples specific to his chosen area of 
specialization) 5 
Exemplars then, in a sense, define the framework of reality for the scientist. 
The researcher sees a phenomenon occurring before him, reflects up<'n it, 
and attempts to place it within some kind of coherent framework, i. e. fit it 
within his disciplinary matrix by applying exemplars learned on the way. 
That is the essential dynamic of normal science. With paradigm thus defined, 
it becomes simpler to give a more focused review of normal science than the 
cursory look given above. Additionally, after having read this section, the 
reader should be able to go back into Masterman's list of definitions above and 
make more sense of it as to the scope of Kuhn's meanings. 
34 Oxford American Dictionary, (1980), s. v. ..exemplar." 
35 Suppc, Structure, 139. 
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Nonnal science proceeds within and defined by the disciplinary matrix. 
As a science begins to work within the matrix it will have at its disposal a small 
and limited number of exemplars. These exemplars will be limited in scope 
and precision with regard to their application to the physical world via 
interaction of symbolic generalizations. One function of the scientists within 
the community then is to further articulate and specify both symbolic 
generalizations and their applications. In other words, the exemplars leave 
open a number of "puzzles" as to bow the generalizations apply to phenomena. 
Exemplars are examined and manipulated so that they can better relate the 
new and revised generalizations to nature. The process evolves. 
The solving of these questions or puzzles from within the framework, 
confines, and perspective supplied by the disciplinary matrix-which in 
turn further articulates and extends that matrix-is the central task of 
normal science.3 6 
Normal science does not have novelty or anomalous discovery as its 
goal. quite the contrary. Instead it is concerned with articulation, 
specification, and coherence of the disciplinary matrix as it presently stands. 
During the course of normal science, certain phenomena may arise which do 
not square with expectations derived from generalizations, models, and 
exemplars. These phenomena are recognized however to the extent that what 
they reflect is beyond the ability of the matrix to cope. 
36 Ibid. , 142. 
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Anomaly appears only against the background provided by the 
disciplinary matrix. The more precise and far-reaching that disciplinary 
matrix is, the more sensitive an indicator it provides of anomaly and 
hence of an occasion for disciplinary matrix change.3 7 
The effort to fit the novel phenomena into the existing matrix by 
adjusting generalizations and exemplars therein is called extraordinary 
research, and is characterized by the tendency of those conducting it to act 
and experiment, and look for new data in a way that is much less formalized 
and structured than in an environment without anomaly. The period in 
which this occurs is called crisis. Extraordinary research resolves the crisis 
in one of three ways: 
(a) the precns1s theories, exemplars and techniques ultimately 
prove able to handle the crisis-provoking problems despite the despair 
of those who have seen it as the end of an existing theory or disciplinary 
matrix; (b) the problem continues to resist even radically new 
approaches and the problemis set aside for a future generation with more 
developed tools; (c) a new candidate for disciplinary matrix emerges with 
an ensuing battle over its acceptance. This third form of resolving crisis 
constitutes a scientific revolution.3 8 
After the revolution occurs, a new normal science, driven by the routines 
reflected by the new disciplinary matrix, comes into being. The dynamic 
repeats over time, and thus can, indeed, UUl.U. science be called a process. 
A scientific revolution can be called a paradigm shift, or a change in 
Weltanschauung, or worldview. Kuhn himself describes such a change as not 
unlike a gestalt shift. 
37 Ibid. ' 143. 
38 Ibid. 146. 
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... paradigm changes do cause scientists to see the world of their 
research-engagement differently. In so far as their only recourse to that 
world is through what they see and do, we may want to say that after a 
revolution scientists are responding to a different world.3 9 
Such a paradigm shift can only happen however, to the person who is 
working within the disciplinary matrix. Changes in microbiology will likely 
not have an effect upon a high energy panicle physicist's worldview. 
Similarly, a physicist who is ideologically opposed to all types of nuclear 
weapons regardless of employment or posture, will not have his worldview 
altered in the least by a change in targeting policy. 
39 Kuhn, Structure, 111. 
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E. CONCLUSION 
A case has been made that the idea of science as "product" is insufficient 
for a comprehensive analysis of the scientific endeavour. This is not to say 
however, that the ministrations of the positivists and their ilk are useless. 
They certainly are not. What those who concentrate on theory do with theory 
is remarkable, both m1thematically and philosophically. "In an essential way, 
the philosophies of Camap and Popper are timeless: outside time, outside 
history ... 4 0 It is essential to realize that the basic logics of Popperian 
falsificationism and Carnapian verificationism are just as valid for 
approaching some sense of truth within the framework of the new thinkers, 
as they are on their own. But, say Kuhn and the others, they are not to be 
addressed exclusively. 
The We It an s c h au u n g thinkers believe that theories alone do not define 
science. Theories, .and the dynamics of their unique geneses however, do. It is 
intended that upon reading the preceding discussion on Kuhnian science, the 
reader will have accepted science as a special and unique process. This done, 
the next chapter will argue that the process of war preparation, strategic 
planning for national security in particular, follows a very similar path to 
that of science. Kuhnian science will be operationalized in a theoretical sense 
and applied to the nuclear strategic process (1945-1989) as a case study. 
40 Hacking, Representing, 6. 
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III. SCIENTIFIC STRATEGIZING: THE NUCLEAR COMMUNITY 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Science is Wl.l the "scientific method." The "method" is merely a cog in a 
much more complex apparatus. Science is a dynamic process which has as its 
goal, nominally, determination of Truth. Of course, this is a bold endeavour. 
Ernst Cassirer, the esteemed humanist philosopher, states that, "Knowledge 
and Truth belong to a transcendental order-to the realm of pure and eternal 
ideas ... 41 But ideational purity and etemality, in all of its metaphysical guises, 
has been subject to fierce questioning as regards the human intellect's ability 
to grasp it. Kant, in his Critique of Pure Reason, rigorously demonstrated the 
myriad limitations of the human mind in attempting to come to grips with 
pure and essential being. or, noumena. But still science seeks Truth. If one 
accepts the premise that absolute Truth can never be uncloaked by the human 
mind (this is ruu to say that there is no Absolute, only that it cannot he reached 
by Man), then it would seem that Science is a futile effon, as its goal could 
never be attained. Despite this, scientists do what they do, day after day. They 
think, they write, they pontificate and theorize. Some even teach. 
The Weltanschauung philosophers do not ovenly deny the existence of 
Truth. They simply do not mention it too frequently. What is most imponant 
41 Ernst Cassirer, An Essay On Man, (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1944), 2. 
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to this school is that theory, and its application to practical life- (i. e. 
experiment, verification processes, or technological development), cohere 
within the bounds of a paradigm, or, disciplinary matrix. They are not overly 
concerned with the metaphysical status of theory, or more exactly, how the 
theory reflects transcendent reality. The paradigm, from its genesis, through 
its development, and to maturity, is the stuff of modem day science, and it is 
the concept of science as defined by the paradigm's temporal progression 
which will guide this chapter. Science is an evolution of ideas which follows a 
unique and interesting pattern. 
The intent of this chapter is to suggest strongly, if not demonstrate 
beyond a doubt, that the evolution of US strategic nuclear policy is 
remarkably similar to the generic scientific process as described by the 
Weltanschauung philosophers of science, most notably Kuhn. Perhaps it 
would be more accurate to say that upon reading this paper, similarities 
between the evolution of US nuclear strategic policy (from 1945-1989)42 and 
that of science will become apparent. The paper is not meant to equate 
strategy with science. only to suggest a basic congruence of the two. In doing 
so it should cause the reader to question his own intuitive notions of what 
science is, and then perhaps, to come to re-examine War fundamentally, using 
a fresh view of science. 
In order to make the argument suggested above, the paper will establish 
an analytic framework based upon the Kuhnian model so that the strategic 
42 It is, perhaps, more accurate to say that though the paper addresses nuclear evolution 
in general, due to space limitations, the case study of the normal scientific dynamic will 
involve the Kennedy-Johnson-Nixon-Ford-Carter sequence of policy initiatives from 
SIOP-62 through the Countervailing strategy (1961-198 1). 
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process and its evolution can be more comprehensively understood therein. 
From there, it will look at key roadmarks along the strategic-historical 
evolutionary continuum, and then attempt to tie them into this framework. If 
War is to be looked upon as an endeavour that is best analyzed as a dichotomy, 
i. e. as preparation .UU. war and conduct Q.i war, then this analysis should 
provoke, if not convince, the reader to explore the problem more thoroughly, 
and perhaps to conclude that if one is to talk about science and war, then one 
should look at science in this Kuhnian sense, that it coheres well with war 
preparation generally, and strategizing specifically. 
Thomas Kuhn and all of the Weltanschauung philosophers of science 
concentrated their efforts upon the natural sciences (physics, chemistry, 
etc.), and all but ignored the social sciences. But if the language and 
theoretical framework of Kuhnian philosophy can be applied to an analysis of 
nuclear strategizing in a convincing manner, then it is sensible to suggest 
that the conduct of developing nuclear strategy may be fundamentally 
scientific if viewed from afar and occurring in history. The argument then is 
to show nC't that strategy is a science, but that strategizing is scientific. 
B. COMMUNITY 
Robert Holt and John Richardson, Jr. take a bard look at Kuhnian science 
and analyze its utility for political science in their chapter, "Competing 
Paradigms in Comparative Politics," in Holt and Turner's The Methodology of 
Comparative Research . They set up a framework which is very useful in 
determining where a particular discipline stands in its formulation of a 
paradigm. What they do not address specifically however is that a group exists 
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that desires to explore a particular subject, that a scientific community is 
working the problem. So, it seems necessary that if one is to argue that the 
nuclear strategic process is progressing scientifically, then a 'community" of 
those initiating the progression must be demonstrated. Science does not occur 
in a void. It requires the active and deliberate mind to initiate the movement. 
Kuhn off::-rs no real operational definition of a scientific community. 
He states only that it operates within a paradigm, (or is in the process ot 
developing one from initial observational, conceptual, and theoretical chaos), 
the members read anl are published in the same journals, they attend the 
same meetings and professional fora etc. Intuitively then, it appears that a 
nuclear strategic community does exist. This intuition is buttressed even 
further if it 1s conceded that to be a scientific com111unity, the group of 
thinkers does not necessarily need to be in consensus regarding the minutia 
of its inquiry, only in the nature and direction of it. 
There are a great many people functioning within the nuclear 
strategic infrastructure. Some are intimately involved with the development 
of theory and policy, and some are superficially involved. Not all input to the 
policy making process is found within the mechanisms of government. 
Think-tanks, such as the RAND Corporation, the Brookings Institute, the 
American Enterprise Institute and many others are highly involved. 
Additionally. members of the American academy, some of whom also work for 
think tanks. or the government directly, are significantly involved. The 
military, as well. has its branches which are responsible for various aspects of 
the policy making process. Roy Liklider identifies three groups operating 
within the strategic community: 
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We may for the sake of convenience, divide it into three different 
groups: the professional military, civilians employed by the government 
(public civilian strategists),and civilians outside of government (private 
nuclear strategists).4 3 
The purpose here is not to break down and classify all actors in the system, 
only to submit that there are many players, and each has varying degrees of 
strength in its input. 
... the strategic community has been considerably enlarged beyond 
the professional military, and after twenty years there is no indication 
that the change is a transient one. It is difficult to contend that either 
the military or civilians have been dominant in strategic decisions; it 
varies with the individual decision, and in any case the lines of debate 
within the strategic community tend to cut across rather than to 
reinforce the military-civilian division.4 4 
There is a good deal of symbiosis among all actors.45 All are interested in one 
subject, nuclear strategy. It is this singularity of professional focus that gives 
the first clue to an observer that a community exists. 
The RAND Corporation is a solid example of a microcosm of this strategic 
community. It is an organization with an aggressive professional direction. 
General Curtis LeMay, while Deputy Chief of Staff for Research and 
Development in 1948 stated, 
43 Roy E. Licklider, The Private Nuclear Strategists, (Columbus, Ohio: The Ohio State 
University Press, 1971 ), 7. A more contemporary analysis may be found in Morton 
Kaplan's The Wizards of Armageddon, (New York, NY: Simon and Schuster, 1983). 
44 Gene Lyons, cited in Licklider, The Private Nuclear Strategists, 1. 
45 In fact, the different actors in the process use the academy vigorously. Here at the 
NPS, for example, certair. professors focus their students' seminar papers upon subjects 
that have been deemed to be of value by a particular strategic "shop" in the Pentagon. 
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Project RAND is a continuing program of scientific study and 
research on the broad subject of air warfare with the object of 
recommending to the Air Force preferred methods, techniques, and 
instrumentalities for this purpose.4 6 
The unity of vision demonstrated by the RANDites was remarkable; and the 
intellectual fennent existing at this institution made for a beady atmosphere 
as well. J~mes Digby grasps this feeling as be writes about Thomas Scbe!ling, 
... Schelling was only at RAND for a year, on sabbatical from Harvard, 
but chapters of his 1960 book, The Strategy of Conflict, were greatly 
influenced by the discussions at RAND- with Hitch, Rowen, Woblstetter, 
Marshall, and with his student, Daniel Ellsberg ... 4 1 
Kuhn's vision of the scientific community's dynamism as necessary in 
articulating a paradigm is exceptionally evident in Schelling's own 
description of RAND, 
As a collection of people, RAND is superb, and I have mentioned above 
only the few whose intellectual impact on me was powerful and 
persistent; many others, truly to numerous to list here, have as 
individuals affected the final shape of this book. But RAND is more than a 
collection of people; it is a social organism characterized by intellect, 
imagination, and good humor.4 8 
It is unnecessary to funber separate and classify individuals within the 
strategic community. For the purposes of this argument, it is only imponant 
to recognize that a there is indeed a group of like-minded (in tenns of subject 
of interest. not necessarily conclusions regarding that subject) individuals 
46 Curtis E. LeMay, cited in James Digby, Strategic Thought at RAND, 1948-1963: The 
Ideas. Their Origins. Their Fates, N-3096-RC, (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 
1990), 4. 
47 Digby, Strategic Thought at Rand, 22. 
48 Thomas Schelling, preface to The Strategy of Coriflict, cited in Digby, Strategic Thought 
at RAND, 23. 
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working to critique, articulate and further clarify issues of this special sort. A 
strategic community does exist.4 9 
C. THE STATUS OF STRATEGY AS "SCIENTIFIC" 
Kuhn's impact upon the academic world was not ignored by political and 
social scientists. Though Kuhn has in mind the natural sciences as his 
primary milieu, it is the idea of this paper that his ideas speak significantly to 
strategy formulation, i. e. war preparation, as well. It must be stated at the 
outset of this analysis that Kuhn himself questions the status of social science 
as a science. He states, 
... and it remains an open question what pans of social science have 
yet acquired such paradigms at all. History suggests that the road to a 
firm research consensus is extraordinarily arduous.5 0 
Strategic theorizing is a social science. This notion is implicit in Bernard 
Brodie's statement, "That strategic theory is reducible to a few common-sense 
propositions does not distinguish it from other social sciences ... (my 
emphasis) ... 51 As policy and strategy-making fall under the rubric of social 
science, it seems that the nuclear strategic process is called into question as 
well, in terms of having achieved a paradigm. It is also important to note that 
49 Liklider's The Private Nuclear Strategists seems to be one of the defining works on the 
subject. He cites others who have done work on the nature of this community as well: Gene 
M. Lyons, Morris Janowitz, Bruce L. R. Smith, Alice Kimball Smith and others. Though 
these thinkers do not focus on the nature of the community in a Kuhnian context, their 
analyses are very useful in doing so, if only in establishing nothing more than the 
existence of a strategic community in a generic sense. 
50 Kuhn, Structure, 15. 




Kuhn in no way precludes the possibility of social science to fully develop a 
paradigm. So, even if it is not established as to whether a particular discipline 
has fully developed a paradigm, the potential exists for it to occur at some 
stage. 
This paper does not argue that the nuclear-strategic endeavour to date 
has articulated any kind of mature and coherent paradigm. It does however, 
posit that the activity of nuclear strategizing is in the process of developing 
its paradigm and as such can be seen as a normal science, and thus, 
necessarily evolutionary. 
The process occurring within the confines of normal science is an 
iterative one, a process that is constantly seeking to better define and redefine 
its terms, and to better phrase its questions. Nuclear strategy is still in the 
early stages of the development of a "new" science. Kuhn writes a 
description of the paradigm-less stage of a science which may be helpful in 
understanding the strategic process better. He says, 
History also suggests, however, some reasons for the difficulties 
encountered on that road [to a research consensus]. In the absence of a 
paradigm or some candidate for paradigm, all of the facts that could 
possibly pertain to the development of a given science are likely to seem 
equally relevant. As a result, early fact-gathering is a far more nearly 
random activity than the one that subsequent scientific development 
makes familiar.5 2 
This passage paints a picture of the pre-paradigmatic stage of normal science 
development as undelineated and proto-plasmic. The body of facts, 
52 Kuhn, Structure, 15. 
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phenomena and observation lacks a meaningful coherence, or ordering 
principle. 
Yet nuclear strategists do not exist and work in an environment which 
is so entropic. Nuclear strategy by no means operates within a fully developed 
paradigm as yet, but it is not chaotic either. A nuclear strategic community 
does exist; and this community is working toward a coherence which will 
move it toward (perhaps never to attain) consensus. It may be the case that 
the strategic discipline will remain broken up into several "schools,'' as 
Charles Glaser or Robert Levine would argue, and never approach unanimity 
of world-view. Yet is important to remember that science evolves, and 
revolutions occur by better articulating and challenging theory. The 
potential for anomaly must exist in order for the science to grow. Unanimity 
may be a pipe dream. Perhaps the lack of it in the nuclear strategic 
community is a good indication of progression. 
D. AN ANALYTIC FRAMEWORK 
Holt and Richardson paraphrase Kuhn as they define a paradigm as " ... a 
pattern or framework that gives organization and direction to a given area of 
scientific investigation ... 53 A paradigm is composed of 6 elements: (1) a 
conceptual element, (2) a theoretical element, (3) rules of interpretation, (4) 
puzzle Identification, (5) criteria of puzzle solution admissibility, and (6) 
ontologie-predictive element. 
53 This description is drawn largely from Robert T. Holt and John M. Richardson, Jr. , 
"Competing Paradigms in Comparative Politics," in Robert T. Holt and John E. Turner, 
eds., The Methodology of Comparative Research, (New York, NY: The Free Press, 1970), 21-
71. 
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The definition of the conceptual element is a bit abstract. Though the 
concept must have some empirical reference, it is judged not upon its truth 
value, but upon its theoretical utility, or, how well it does in explaining or 
predicting when fit within a theory. A conceptual element answers the 
question, "Of what is reality composed?" These elements are nothing more 
than what the mathematician John Kemeny calls "free creations of the human 
mind which have proved useful for the formation of theories about 
ex peri en c e . "54 h is apparent then, that while able to be defined, the 
conceptual element is most meaningful when looked at when used within a 
theory which is subsequently used to explain or predict. "Crisis stability" can 
be seen as an example of a strategic concept. 
The theoretical element is actually a composite of several ideas, all of 
which are connected to that of theory. A theory is a "deductively connected 
set of propositions, which are, depending on their logical position with 
respect to one another, either axioms or theorems."55 The distinction between 
axioms and theorems is not particularly important here, but it should be 
realized that the propositions which are logically connected, be they axiom or 
theorem, are composed of the conceptual elements. 
The theoretical elements can be subjected to various tests of empirical 
verification or falsification. Truth value is assigned to a proposition thereon. 
Since a theory is merely a construct of conceptual elements, it cannot really 
be said to exist independently, (though this has been disputed by 
54 John G. Kemeny, A Philosopher Loolcs at Science, (Princeton, NJ: Van Norstrand 
Publishers, 1959), 138. 
55 Holt and Richardson, Comparative Research, 24. 
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metaphysicians for centuries). Therefore, a theory cannot be falsified or 
verified per se. Its predictions however, can be, as those predictions are 
reflective of the observable world. Rules of interpretation S 6 are the third 
element of a paradigm and telJ the scientists how best to use language to 
describe observation, and how to use observation to falsify or verify the 
theories' predictions. 
The puzzle solving element of a paradigm is important because it 
involves a consensus of the community deciding upon which questions merit 
response, so as to better expand, focus and delineate the paradigm holistically. 
The solutions of the puzzles must have a criteria of admissibility which is 
derived from the theoretical/conceptual context of the paradigm. 
The question that must be posed to the scholar who has formulated a 
particular "solution" is not simply, can this formulation be derived from 
some set of general premises and rules of interpretation, but rather can 
it be derived from that set of general premises and rules of interpretation 
that are defined by the paradigm.S 1 
If the question is asked, the answer must be formulated within the context of 
the paradigm. If the answer involves the formation of new concepts, and 
theorems derived therefrom, and these are not derivable from the existent 
paradigm, but from some other as yet undefined conceptual/theoretical body, 
then the potential for crisis and subsequent revolution exists. A new 
paradigm must be formulated which can answer the question, and all others 
that went before. 
56 These rules of interpretation are akin to what the positivists would call 
"correspondence rules." 
57 Holt and Richardson, Comparative Research, 26. 
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The sixth element of a paradigm is the ontologie-predictive element. 
This is much less explicit than the preceding five but represents the paradigm 
as it would look if aniculated fully. It defines the boundaries of the puzzles, 
and it suggests what a full set of laws might look like. In essence it is the 
vision of the scientist that a solution exists in full which drives him to funher 
develop his work. It is the intuitive knowledge that once aniculated, the 
paradigm will serve to answer any and all relevant questions with no 
probability of crisis. It is the inspiration derived from the realization of the 
possibility that .a.n. answer may be lh.t. answer. 
E. CONCEPT AND THEORY 
Holt and Turner's conceptual, theoretical and rule interpretational 
elements of a paradigm all make sense within the nuclear strategic endeavour. 
Indeed, much of what "normal" strategic theorizing does is defining and 
aniculating these elements. Concepts and theories are manipulated in order to 
attempt to answer the paradigm's core puzzles, or questions. 
The following passage is an argument which "proves" that crisis 
stability can be adjusted as a function of survivability. 
41 
For a crisis to be stable, the incentives to preempt must be low. The 
lower the incentives to preempt, the more stable the situation is. The 
most stable situation then, is one wherein exists wz. incentive to preempt 
for either side. Of course, that scenario only exists as an ideal type, 
because it implies no vulnerabilities on either side; and this is 
unrealistic. It does point to an important concept however. If the logic 
above holds, then decreasing vulnerability results in increasing crisis 
stability. Increasing survivability equates to decreasing vulnerability. 
Thus, increasing survivability will result in increasing crisis stability. 
As mobility leads to survivability, mobile systems will improve crisis 
stability.5 8 
The argument may or may not be considered dubious. It does not matter for 
the purposes here. The passage above does demonstrate the existence of 
theory and conceptual tools in the world of nuclear strategy. 
It is simple to pull some concepts from the passage: "crisis stability," 
"preemption," "incentive," "vulnerability," "survivability," and others. 
These are just words, but they signify meaning, meaning which is important 
in answering various questions. Uttering of these word/concepts alone does 
not make an argument. However, if two or more concepts are connected using 
standard logical tools, 
-The Minuteman III system is either survivable or vulnerable. 
-Minuteman III is not survivable. 
-Therefore Minuteman Ill is vulnerable. 
-Increased vulnerability equates to decreased survivability. 
-Decreased survivability results in decreased crisis stability. 
-Thus Minuteman III results in decreased crisis stability. 
Thus arguments can be formed. 
58 This is my own formulation of the argument taken from my final paper, a critique of 
Scott Sagan's Moving Targets, for Professor Wirtz's NS 3280 class. It is by no means 
unique, and apparently, given contemporary US strategic procurement policy, not the least 
convincing. 
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The logic used in this syllogism cannot be questioned with any 
authority. If aJI premises are true, then the conclusion is true as well. This 
argument is composed of concepts and theories. These are used, connected by 
various logical operations, to formulate an argument. The argument would 
then be used perhaps, to affect strategic policy in terms of procurement and 
posturing. 
Upon being exposed to this argument, nuclear theorists would respond 
as normal science dictates. They would eviscerate the argument by 
questioning every angle of it. If Colin Gray were to read such an argument he 
would surely think it the 'zenith of mongoloid reasoning!•59 and then go on to 
lambast it roundly. One among many scathing criticisms might go something 
like this: 
... to claim a blessing from the intellectual deity known as stability is 
the first reson of a scoundrel. Stability is a concept of very easy vinue, 
readily rented by those in need. As a candidate master concept, stability 
is suffi~iently imprecise in its terms, conditions, and implications 
that it means whatever an unscrupulous debater wants it to mean.6 0 
Nuclear strategists can be a surly and pugnacious lot. Gray's commentary on 
the concept of "stability" is a good example of the kind of discourse that occurs 
daily in normal science as a paradigm is being more explicitly aniculated. His 
questioning of a concept is no different from Einstein questioning the concept 
of the singularity, 
59 Woody Allen. "Conversations With Helmholtz," from Getting Even, (New York, NY: 
Random House. 1966), 116. 
60 Colin S. Gray. "The Definitions and Assumptions of Deterrence: Questions of Theory 
and Practice." Journal of Strategic Studies 13, no. 4 (December 1990), 6. 
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Einstein himself reluctantly admitted that singularities were 
mathematically possible in general relativity, but thought they were 
nonsense as far as the real world was concerned. After all a real 
physical object could never be squeezed down to a point, could it?6 1 
Both are trying to come to grips with an entity that is supposedly useful in 
describing and explaining phenomena in their fields of inquiry. Both are 
questioning the concept's utility; and the questions asked may result in 
funher explication of the concepts, possible adjustments made in supponing 
theory, and perhaps, increased utility within the paradigm. 
There can be little doubt that concepts and theories do exist in the arena 
of nuclear strategy. Their functions are the same as those in any "hard" 
science. It is the case that many of the concepts and theories in the social 
science do not lend themselves as easily to quantification and applicability of 
analytic techniques. But to be called "scientific" does not require such 
criteria. What is required is reasonable discourse by a group of conceptually 
focused, hopefully inspired, thinkers, and the potential to evolve from its 
discourse. 
Holt and Turner's analysis of Kuhnian science is a useful one. The 
conceptual and theoretical elements of the paradigm are imponant but not 
particularly novel. It is important to realize that the 
conceptual/theoretical/rules of interpretation elements of the paradigm are 
key elements in any vision of science. In fact, the positivists were accused of 
too myopic a view in this regard. They would concentrate fully upon concept, 
theory, and rules of correspondence between observation and language, and 
61 Dennis Overbye, LoMly Hearts of the Cosmos: The Story of the Scientific Quest for the 
Secret of the Universe, (New York, NY: HarperCollins Publishers, 1991), 90. 
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then make judgements upon the ontological grounding of their arcane 
ministrations. Kuhnian science is concerned with the human element, the 
sociology of scientific knowledge. Important to Kuhnians is the interaction 
and concensus-building, or concensus-wrecking occurring within the 
paradigm. 
F. PUZZLES 
Concepts and theory are used to answer questions. These questions bound 
the paradigm. These questions are what Holt and Turner call "puzzles." As 
normal science progresses, the concepts and theories used to solve the puzzles 
are more accurately articulated, this articulation coming in the form of re-
definition, or responses to critique, such as Colin Gray's critique of stability, 
for example. 
To "urther connect Kuhnian science to nuclear strategy, in light of the 
above, it needs to be shown that a body of questions, or "puzzles," exists for the 
nuclear strategists. Charles L. Glaser, in an essay entitled "Why Do Strategists 
Disagree about the Requirements of Strategic Nuclear Deterrence?," in Lynn 
Eden and Steven Miller's edited volume, Nuclear Arguments: Understanding 
the Strategic Nuclear Arms and Arms Control Debates, separates the debate 
occurring within the nuclear strategic community. He divides the debate into 
three schools: Punitive Retaliation, Military Denial, and Damage Limitation. 
These three schools are defined by classifying the answers given to 6 very 
fundamental questions: (1) Will the Soviet Union risk nuclear war to expand?, 
(2) What assets does the Soviet Union value most?, (3) Can the US limit damage 
to itself in an all out war?, (4) What determines advantage between 
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superpowers?, (5) How does the difficulty of limiting a war affect 
deterrence?, and (6) What is required for crisis stability? 62 The answers to 
these questions not only determine which school one belongs to, but they also 
have a great bearing on weapons procurement and force posturing policies. 
Looked at from the angle of this paper, these questions are profoundly 
important. They are the core of the developing paradigm. Of course, these 
specific questions are not dictated to the community by any higher power. 
They do represent however, the broad spectrum of issues which strategic 
theorists and planners grapple with. So, this base of questions should be 
looked at as reflecting the various "puzzles" which have been determined to 
be of importance by the community. For example, few would argue that 
Russian goals and motives are not important; and it would be silly to think 
that attempts at analyzing the possibility of limiting nuclear war are 
inconsequential. 63 These fundamental questions, rather their breakdown, will 
ultimately allow entrance to contemporary strategic theory, a theory which, it 
will be argued, is caught in the quagmire of crisis. 
Science has Truth as its goaL Paleontologists work to determine 
whether the dinosaur extinction occurred due to a potent virus, a volcanic 
eruption, or the impacting of Earth with a comet. The answer may be one, or 
could be all of the above, but there U. an answer. Paleontologists are 
manipulating the analytical tools of their paradigm according to certain rules 
62 Charles L. Glaser, Nuclear Arguments: Understanding the Strategic Nuclear Arms and 
Arms Control Debates, Eden, Lynn, and Miller, Steven E. , eds. , (Ithaca NY: Cornell 
University Press, 1989), 114. 
63 I believe Glaser omitted one very important question, "What is required for extended 
deterrence?," but nevertheless, the list is still very comprehensive in scope. 
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and are trying to discern what real! y happened. Similarly, nuclear strategy 
has as its goal a truth as well. Except, rather than seeking to define a discrete 
fact, such as the cause of the dinosaur extinction for example, nuclear 
strategy attains to a more normative, less objective ideal, it aims to find a 
"best" way to maintain the territorial, political, and cultural integrity of the 
United States within the nuclear environment. The quest for the "best" 
strategy is evolutionary. Many thinkers have offered their visions as to the 
right way to maintain the security of America; but this discourse has varied 
and adapted as the cultural, technological and political environment has 
changed. 
G. NUCLEAR EVOLUTION 
Recall that Kuhnian science is both evolutionary and revolutionary. It is 
evoluti0nary when it is "normal science," as the existing paradigm is moving 
and adapting and struggling to more explicitly articulate concepts and 
theories and/or reconcile anomaly within the bounds of the paradigm. It is 
revolutionary as it meets anomaly, is unable to square it with the existing tools 
of the paradigm. goes into crisis, and emerges again to be able to deal more 
effectively with reality. So if one is to look at nuclear strategy as resembling 
Kuhnian science, he must be able to identify both evolutiollary trends, and 
their causes, and the potential for crisis and ultimately revolution, through 
identification of anomaly. 
This section of the paper is not an attempt to comprehensively review 
lTS strategic nuclear history, indeed, it is not necessary. What needs to be 
shown however. is the evolutionary progression that strategy follows. A 
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science evolves as its concepts, theories, and products are criticized and 
explicated. Evolution in science equates to aniculation. 
It makes sense at this juncture to identify and, hopefully, resolve a 
rather obvious criticism of the evolutior.ary ar6v··'- ~!. It could be suggested 
that evolution as ~·ational discourse, whtch is what the paper argues, is rather 
silly. Evolution, it might be said, is response and adaptation to environment, 
just as Darwin suggested in 1859, and this is true. The analogy between 
doctrinal and biological evolution only goes so far however. An organism 
reacts to its environment, and changes physiologically, so to adapt without the 
catalyst of an internal or external "reason." A strategic doctrine, on the other 
hand, evolves through the conduit of Mind.6 4 
Leon Sloss and Marc Dean Millot posit three factors that have dominated 
the evolution of official US nuclear strategy: the changing nuclear balance, 
changes in technolog:;, and a wider appreciation in Washington of Soviet 
views of nuclear war.65 This seems an astute judgement. It brings to light 
though, ~he differences between evolution in the biological sense, and 
evolution of theory. Theory is a function of human, or at least intelligent, 
deliberation. Theory is adaptive only insofar as it is guided by reason. 
Certainly Sloss and Mil lot's strategic evolutionary causes are valid ones; but 
the scientific reason, and articulation of the paradigm comes more 
convincingly into play as thinkers attempt to ~orne to terms with the effects 
64 The icea for a need to differentiate between types of evolution was inspired by reading 
various essays from Stephen Jay Gould, Bully for Brontosaurus: Reflections in Natural 
History, (New York, NY: W. W. Norton & Company, 1991). 
65 Leon Sloss and Marc Dean Millot, "US Nuclear Strategy In Evolution." Strategic Review, 
(Winter 1984), 26. 
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the new conditions or realizations have upon the body of theory and concept, 
and how 1hu may best evolve doctrine. Doctrinal evolution thus, is a human 
process. One must be cautious in attributing direct cause to a phenomenon, (e. 
g. technological change) when in fact that phenomenon may be a step 
removed from Mind in the evolutionary process. 
As a case study of this "evolution as articulation" idea in nuclear 
strategy, the period from 1961 to 1980 will be focused upon. The period begins 
with President Kennedy's displeasure with "massive retaliation," and moves 
into the McNamara doctrinal adjustments, President Nixon's declared chagrin 
at the relative rigidity of Assured Destruction doctrine, through the 
formulation of NSDM-242, past PD-18, and into President Carter's PD-59 and the 
Countervailing strategy. 
President John Kennedy was briefed on the Single Integrated 
Operational Plan (SlOP) 62 on 13 September, 1961. 66 At the erd of the 
briefing, Kennedy was dismayed at the significant lack of flexibility found 
therein. As a reaction to this 5eemingly monolithic and immalleable targeting 
plan, a reflection of the Eisenhower administration's "massive retaliation" 
idea, he ordered flexibility incorporated into the SIOP.6 7 
66 Scott D. Sagan, "SIOP-62: The Nuclear War Plan Briefing to President Kennedy." 
International Security 12, no. 1 (Summer 1987), 22. 
67 It is interesting to note that JSTPS at least payed lip service to the idea of flexibility 
in SIOP-62, but their opinion was not convincingly in favor of it at all. They wrote 
"Notwithstanding the above, the current SlOP does have certain flexibility-some of which 
is built into the plan by design, and some of which, although not included in the design of 
the plan, is inherent in the mechanism for control of forces committed to the plan." 
[Sagan, SlOP ... ] 
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The Kennedy administration, which came into office on 20 January 
1961, began with a complete and unequivocal rejection of the Eisenhower 
administration's basic national strategic policy of Massive Retaliation, 
which it chose to interpret as a wholly inflexible doctrine. One of its first 
acts was to order the revision of the December 1960 SlOP in order to 
provide the president with various options from which he could choose 
in the event of a nuclear exchange with the Soviet Union. 6 8 
SIOP-63, which incorporated Kennedy's changes to SIOP-62, 
... distinguished more clearly among ... three tasks: ... attack 
nuclear threat targets, (2) other military forces, and ( 3) 
industrial targets. It also provided options for withholding 




After extensive consultation with key members of the strategic 
community, in this case Air Force BG Noel Parrish, and the RAND Corporation's 
William W. Kaufmann, regarding a Counterforce/No Cities strategy, Secretary 
of Defense McNamara subscribed to the plan.? 0 
McNamara received a briefing on counterforce/no c1t1es from 
Kaufmann early in his tenure and seemed attracted by its possibilities as 
an alternative to massive retaliation as a nudear response ... Kennedy, 
McNamara, and Rusk apparently agreed with this position.71 
Daniel Ellsberg, Frank Trinkle, and Alain Enthoven, all RANDites, were key 
players in revising the new SlOP. In order to provide the Soviet Union with 
68 Desmond Ball, "The Development of the SlOP, 1960-1983." In Strategic Nuclear 
Targeting, eds. Desmond Ball and Jeffrey Riche! son, (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University 
Press, 1986), 62. 
69 Henry S. Rowen cited in Aaron L. Friedberg, "The Evolution of US Strategic 
"Doctrine"-1945 to 1981." In Samuel P. Huntington ed. , The Strategic Imperative, New 
Policies for American Security, (Cambridge, MA: Ballinger Press, 1982), 60. 
70 Alfred Goldberg, A Brief Su,.vey of the Evolution of Counterforce, RM-5431-PR, (Santa 
Monica. CA: The Rand Corporation, 1967), 17-25. 
71 Ibid. , 25. 
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nuclear options other than a fierce and massive strike, Moscow was taken off 
of the US target list in late 1961.7 2 The flination with a no cities policy was 
brief. It suffered much criticism both domestically and from the US' NATO 
allies, and ultimately resulted in its replacement. Desmond Ball offers the 
following major criticisms: 
(I) counterforce targeting implies a first strike, (2) the Soviets 
reacted with outrage to the idea that nuclear war could be executed with 
restraint; and they reaffirmed their own strategy of massive attack on 
both military and urban targets simultaneously, (3) NATO countries felt 
that counterforce targeting would deny European nuclear independence, 
and (4) the Air Force used the call to counterforce suppon a massive 
system procurement plan which would have been very costly .7 3 
The criticism of no cities was convincing enough to cause a shift into a 
targeting policy called Assured Destruction. Assured Destruction, a construct 
of McNamara's efficiency-oriented mind, relied on a criteria of cost 
effectiveness. 
This doctrine held that a nuclear exchange would, with high 
probability, result in over 100 million fatalities in both the US and the 
USSR and that attempts to limit damage through active and passive 
defences could be readily defeated by improvements in offensive 
forces ... The damage criterion settledon by McNamara for determining the 
size of the strategic force was the destruction of 20-25 percent of the 
Soviet population and 50 percent of its industrial capacity.74 
72 Desmond Ball, Deja Vu: The Return to Counterforce in the Nixon Administration, 
(California Seminar on Arms Control and Foreign Policy, Santa Monica, CA, December 
1974), 12. 
73 Ball, Strategic Targeting, 67-68. 
74 Henry S. Rowen, "The Evolution of Strategic Nuclear Doctrine." In Laurence Martin 
ed.. Strategic Thought in the Nuclear Age, (london: Heinemann, 1979), 146. 
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This idea of Assured Destruction continued throughout the remainder of the 
60's. While McNamara pushed for Assured Destruction, he also did not ignore 
the counterforce damage limitation requirements championed by Lt. Col. 
Glenn Kent. 7 5 This synthesis of Assured Destruction and Damage Limitation 
resulted in a constantly swelling target list that, while perhaps more precisely 
defined in tenns of a targeting agenda than SIOP-62, was similar in strategy. 
Hit everything, hard! Rowen affirms this, 
... the nuclear planning process experienced no important change from 
the early 1960's until 1974. The assignment of weapons to a growing 
target list went on in accordance with the political direction established 
in the early '60's. 7 6 
The Schlesinger Doctrine, Nixon's response to the strategic targeting 
monolith, would initiate one of the first major strategic changes with any kind 
of staying power. 
It is important to note, in furthering the idea of evolution as paradigm 
development, that while the nuclear strategy in the '60, changed very little in 
practice, the intellectual seed of flexibility as a concept was introduced and 
developed rather robustly. The military officers from JSTPS who designed 
SIOP-62 recognized the importance of flexibility, though they did not like the 
idea too much at all. Kennedy recognized a need for flexibility and demanded 
that it be incorporated more fully into national strategic policy. 
McNamara and his "brightest" studied the problem with the help of 
other members of the community and attempted to direct strategy toward a 
75 Ball, Strategic Targeting, 68. 
76 Rowen, Strategic Imperative, 61. 
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countervalue/no cities targeting scheme. Though this scheme was rejected 
after a brief period of being in vogue. and McNamara advocated the relatively 
rigid Assured Destruction doctrine thereafter, the Secretary still championed 
flexibility in response and countervalue targeting in his public statements. 
So, the seeds of flexibility never did die in the '60s. In fact they sprouted and 
resulted in what would become the Schlesinger Doctrine in 1974. 
The idea of flexible nuclear options was rejuvenated in President 
Richard Nixon's annual foreign policy re·.-iew of 25 Feb, 1971, in which he 
said, 
.. .I must not be-and my successors must not be-limited to the 
indiscriminate mass destruction of enemy civilians as the sole possible 
response to challenges. We must insure that we have the forces and 
procedures that provide us with alternatives appropriate to the nature 
and the level of the provocation. This means having the plans and 
command and control capabilities necessary to enable us to select and 
carry out the appropriate response without necessarily having to reson 
to mass destruction.?? 
Assured destruction was excessively rigid, especially in response to emerging 
Soviet technological breakthroughs. As the rigidity became more 
pronounced, the credibility of the posture also waned. It was argued that 
massive countervalue attacks could act as a self-deterrent in the face of 
various potential forms of Soviet aggression. 1 8 
Early in the Nixon administration, a set of studies was undertaken 
which concerned limited nuclear targeting options. The results of these 
studies were codified in National Security Study Memorandum (NSSM)-169, and 
77 Richard M. Nixon, cited in Sloss and Millot, 20. 
78 Sloss and Millot, 22. 
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this led to National Security Decision Memorandum (NSDM)-242.79 Secretary 
of Defense James Schlesinger publicly outlined some elements of the new 
targeting doctrine in his FY 1975 Defense Department Report, hence it came to 
be known as the "Schlesinger Doctrine." 
It is important to realize that James Schlesinger came from a strategic 
environment of great vitality. He spent 6 years ( 1963-1969) as a weapons 
systems analyst at RAND. It is reported that he became "haunted by 
Strangelove scenarios of accidental nuclear confrontation," and so began to 
explore other alternatives more vigorously.80 His vision of nuclear warfare, 
cultivated at RAND left no doubt as to why he would later call for such an 
intense focus on flexibility and counterforce. 
Given the prospective strategic balance, with the potential for 
devastation embodied in the forces that would survive a disarming attack, 
it becomes very hard to envisage nuclear war being initiated suddenly 
with all-out strikes. If it were to come it would be in a sequence of 
escalating steps from a lower-level confrontation. 8 1 
The Schlesinger Doctrine was comprised of three basic elements: (1) 
escalation control, (2) a secure reserve force, and (3) counter-recovery 
targeting.82 The concept of escalatwn control was critical for the new policy. 
It was deemed necessary that the NCA be able to deliberately control the 
progress of a nuclear exchange. The memorandum stated that the US must be 
79 Jeffrey Richelson, "PD-59, NSDD-13 and the Reagan Strategic Modernization Program." 
The Journal of Strategic Studies 6, no. 2 (June 1983), 128. 
80 Ball, Deja Vu, 33. 
81 James Schlesinger, in Ball, Deja Vu, 33. 
82 Sloss and Millot, 22-23. 
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able to "hold some vital enemy targets hostage to subsequent destruction" and 
to have control of "the timing and pace of attack execution, in order to provide 
the enemy opportunities to consider his actions ... g 3 
Implicit in the above is the need for a secure reserve force. This force 
would hold targets hostage while incremental steps of escalation or 
termination are being carried out. In his FY 1975 Report, Schlesinger stated, 
With a reserve capability for threatening urban-industrial targets, 
with offensive systems capable of increased flexibility and 
discrimination in targeting,and with concomitant improvements in 
sensors, surveillance. and command-control, we could implement 
response options that cause far less civilian damage than would now be 
the case.8 4 
The las: major element of NSDM-242 was the specification that if 
escalation was not controllable, the US should target the Soviets so to impede 
So\'iet recovery. 
The objective of such an attack would be to delay for as long as 
possible the Soviet Union's recovery to the status of a major military and 
economic power. This strategy ... specified the destruction of 70 percent of 
the Soviet economic recovery base. 8 5 
This is important for two major reasons. Frst, it was the first time ·that official 
word was promulgated which set post-war objectives. Second, and most 
importantly it represented the introduction of a concept which was 
83 Ball, Strategic Targeting, 12. 
84 James Schlesinger, "Annual Defense Department Report 1975." In Philip Bobbit, 
Lawrence Freedman, Gregory F. Trevenon eds. , US Nuclear Strategy, (Washington Square, 
NY: New York University Press, 1989), 382. 
85 Jeffrey Richelson. "The Dilemmas of Counterpower Targeting." In Comparative Politics 
2, no. 3 ( 1980). 224. 
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interesting and useful as a theoretical entity. It fit well within the new 
counterforce flexibility doctrine, however, it was not subject to the intense 
critical scrutiny which should normally occur upon introduction of so 
dramatic an idea into a community of thinkers. Nevertheless, this counter-
recovery notion drove US targeting and procurement policy. 
This priority counterindustrial recovery strategy produced a huge 
analytical effort to understand Soviet economic recovery capabilities 
after a nuclear war. The resulting studies showed that significantly 
larger numbers of weapons were required to achieve the counter-
recovery objective. 8 6 
As soon as the Caner adminis(;·ation took office, the President initiated a 
review of strategic policy. The result was known as PD-18 and endorsed the 
main elements of Nixon's NSDM-242 as articulated to that point, pending 
further review. The directive also ordered studies to be carried out on the 
subjects of targeting policy, C31 requirements for the reserve force, and 
counterforce capabilities which focused on the MX missile system. 8 7 
As part of the targeting review, PD-18 deemphasized the counter-
recovery targeting aspect of the plan. As alluded to above, this shift in 
emphasis reflected the fact that proper study into the real meaning of 
counter-recovery targeting had not taken place when the policy was first 
incorporated. 
86 Scott D. Sagan. Moving Targtts: Nucltar Strattgy and National Stcurity, (Princeton, 
NJ: Princeton University Press, 1989), 46. 
87 Sloss and Millot, 24. 
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Studies undertaken between 1975 and 1978 highlighted the extreme 
difficulties inherent in determining with any confidence how recovery 
would progress after a large scale nuclear attack. The problem of 
recovery from a large scale nuclear war was simply not well 
understood ... 8 8 
Michael Kennedy and Kevin N. Lewis point out that, 
... some prominent assessments in the open literature have alleged 
that the USSR can recover from even an all-out US strike in the short 
interval of four years at the least, and on up to fifteen years at the 
outside. depending on the severity of the US attack and the performance 
of Soviet active and civil defenses. 8 9 
It seems clear that when NSDM-242 introduced the idea of counter-recovery 
targeting, it had not been explored thoroughly by the community using the 
appropriate analytical, and qualitative techniques. 
The problem with counter-recovery targeting well illustrates the 
evolutionary nature of US targeting doctrine, and strategy as a whole. Though 
CR targeting was incorporated into strategy a bit hastily, it was nevertheless 
subsequently exr-lored. It was found wanting and the appropriate changes 
were made in policy. Thus, does evolution occur. 
After the studies ordered by PD-18 were completed and decisions were 
made. President Carter signed PD-59. The policy contained in PD-59 came to be 
known as the "countervailing strategy." Harold Brown outlines the 
intellectual guidance of countervailing strategy in his address to the Naval 
War College on 20 August 1980: 
81:! Ibid. 
89 Michael Kennedy and Kevin N. Lewis, "On Keeping Them Down; or, Why Do Recovery 
Models Recover So Fast?." In Ball and Richelson, Strategic Targeting, 194. 
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We must have forces, contingency plans, and command and control 
capabilities that will convince the Soviet leadership that DO war and DO 
course of aggression by them that led to the use of nuclear weapons--on 
any scale of attack and at any stage of conflict-could lead to, victory, 
however they may define victory. Firmly convincing them of that 
fundamental truth is the surest restraint against their being tempted to 
aggression. 9 0 
PD-59 reflected the necessary changes resulting from the PD-18 studies. This 
directive altered US strategy in two basic ways. First, it called for a shift in 
targeting emphasis from the economic counter-recovery targeting emphasis 
called for in NSDM-242 to Soviet strategic military, leadership, and other 
military targets. Second, it called on strategists to develop the capability to 
fight a war which could be protracted (lasting months), rather than one 
which would last only a matter of days.91 Compared to previous strategies, 
Harold Brown saw the biggest difference in PD-59 as the fact.that PD-59, 
... is a specific recognition that our strategy has to be aimed at what the 
Soviets think is important to them, not just what we might think would be 
important to us in their view.9 2 
The countervailing strategy has undergone little change from its 
inception to the present day. SIOP-6, of 1 October 1981, was the first to 
incorporate the elements of PD-59 by including the concept of protracted 
nuclear war, increased emphasis on targeting leadership and relocatable 
targets, and elimination of the counter-recovery mission. SIOP-6F, of 1 
90 Harold Brown, in Bobbit et. al. , US Nuclear Strategy, 411. 
91 Richelson, "PD-59 ... " , 128. 
92 Harold Brown, in Sagan, Moving Targets, 49. 
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October 1989, emphasized prompt counterleadership options and the 
development of "adaptive target planning ... 9 3 
The idea of evolution as aniculation of conceptual and theoretical 
elements in the effort to answer the imponant paradigm-defining questions 
can be seen in two profound ways in the preceding survey of strategic 
history. It can be seen in the iterative process of developing the concept of 
flexibility, and it can be seen in a "new" look at deterrence under Harold 
Brown and the Countervailing Strategy. Brown's statement, that the US must 
be able to menace, "what the Soviets think is imponant to them ... " This 
statement is important because it represents official recognition that the US 
over the previous years may have been applying its own values to the Soviet 
Union 9 4. assuming that it would react as the US would if faced with the same 
peril. In an evolutionary sense, this statement represented an adjustment in 
the way that the US thought about the concert of deterrence. 
It is imperative to note that the preponderance of individuals who write 
about strategy and strategic history see the progress as evolutionary. It is 
doubtful whether they lv.:)k at evolution in the sense of paradigm articulation 
and Kuhnian normal science, but nevertheless, they see it as evolutionary as 
relative to some criteria. Aaron Friedberg, speaking of strategic prescriptions 
for 1982 and beyond, says, 
93 Desmond Ball and Robert C. Toth, "Revising the SlOP: Taking War-Fighting to 
Dangerou.> Ex.trP.mes." In International Security 14, no. 4 (Spring 1990), 67. 
94 I realize that Brown's statement is not a particularly profound one. The notion of the 
importance of dett:rmining the deterree's normative orientation has been around for some 
time. The fact that the statement was public though, seems to be important in terms of 
paradigm development. 
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But it should be clear by now that the necessary changes really 
involve a shift in emphasis more than they do a dramatic intellectual 
counterrevolution in which all modem concepts are banished to the 
garbage heap of history .9 5 
Sloss and Millot, commenting on the period from 1960-1980 submit, "As one 
looks back over the past two decades, changes in US nuclear strategy, although 
incremental and evolutionary, have had a significant, cumulative effect ... 9 6 
Jeffery Richelson posits, 
[PD-59] does represent, as Carter Administration secretary of Defense 
Harold Brown claimed, an evolutionary rather than revolutionary shift 
in US targeting policy. Evolutionary rather than revolutionary in that 
what is being altered is the targeting emphasis rather than the target 
sets per se. 9 7 
Other examples of officials and authors positing the evolutionary tendencies 
of US nuclear strategy exist. The importance of this discussion is simply to 
demonstrate that even analysts who are not using any kind of formally 
operationalized criteria of paradigmatic development see the history in the 
same way. 
Two examples of Kuhn:an evolution stand out from the historical 
discussion above. First, the concept of flexibility in response was offered by 
the military officers in JSTPS who prepared s·oP-62. They did not support 
flexibility. but they did introduce it as a concept officially, and as such, ii the 
history of the SlOP and the discussions and argument surrounding its 
formulation are followed. one will see the presence of flexibility to the 
95 Aaron Friedburg, Strategic Imperative, 92. 
96 Sloss and Millot, 26. 
97 Richelson, "PD-59 .... " 130. 
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current day. Flexibility is a concept; as such the community will respond to it 
by explicating and attempting to fit it into existing theory. (For example, 
analyzing how "flexibility" affects credibility and how this change in 
credibility, if any, would impact upon the deterrence calculus). This was done. 
To pirate and adjust the words of the anonymous Columbia professor quoted by 
W amer Schilling, "What in the name of God is "flexibility" and what can you 
do with it?"9 8 This is asked facetiously, but it is intended to drive home the 
point that the strategic community, or any scientific community, is 
responsible for critiquing the new concepts and theories and exploring their 
po<;sibilities. If the question of what to du with flexibility had never been 
asked, likely the fallacy of counter-recovery targeting would never have been 
discovered. And normal science occurs, the paradigm develops. 
Adam M. Garfinkle, in his "The Attack on Deterrence: Reflections on 
Morality and Praxis," makes the case, drawing heavily from the philosophical 
lexicon of the esteemed humanist, Ernst Cassirer, that the concept of 
deterrence has moved through 3 three cognitive phases since the mid-40s: 
mimetic. ana logic. and recursive.99 The mimetic stage "was characterized by 
the assumption that deterrence was a condition discovered about a new 
technical reality of the war." The ana logic stage "w~s ~ · .aracterized by the 
reaiization that human choices and volition effected the deterrence 
98 Anonymous Columbia University professor, in Warner Schilling, "US Strategic 
Concepts in the 1970's: The Sea. ch for Sufficiently Equivalent Countervailing Parity." 
From Steven E. Miller ed. , Strategy and Nuclear Dtttrrtnce, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 1984), 184. 
99 Adam M. Garfinkle. "The Attack on Deterrence: Reflections on Morality and Strategic 
Praxis." In Journal of Strategic Studies 12, no. 2 (June 1989), 168. 
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relationship." In this stage deterrence evolved from a condition to a theory 
about a condition. The recursive stage is characterized by the realization that 
"our definitions and conceptions of deterrence are not derivative of 
technological change, but central to and definitive of the relationship itself." 
This is extremely interesting because first, it is agreement with the 
main premise that the notion of deterrence, as a concept to be articulated, is 
evolutionary. But it is even more interesting in the implication that the 
strategic community, as the group who works with definitions and 
conceptions. can act to define the relationship itself. The planners and doers 
of the community can change the condition by altering the concepts. In a 
sense he is saying that the community can guide the process in whatever 
direction it wants. But in a deterrent relationship, it would appear that it takes 
two to come to a consensus about which direction to proceed. Finally, and 
dramatically, in a Kuhn ian context, at least as applied to the "social sciences," 
the community can bring about its own revolution. This is a bold notion put 
forth by Garfinkle and one that merits consideration. It seems however. that, 
that there may be a bit more technological determinism than he admits. The 
massive destructive potential of nuclear weapons causes the adjustment of 
concepts and definitions within the community to be a bit conservative. 
Nevertheless, the lesson that theory is dependent upon the corpus of 
observers is not lost. 
H. REVOLUTION 
If the sirategic process is to be looked at as akin to the scientific process, 
then the potential for revolutior. must be demonstrated. Of course this can be 
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done theoretically by saying that revolution occurs when the concepts become 
meaningless or non-coherent, or the puzzles which define the paradigm have 
fallen into crisis. As luck would have it (for pedagogical purposes of course!), 
the US strategic community is today iu the throes of a crisis unlike any ever 
experienced before. 
The events of 1989-1991 in the communist world have shaken the 
international order. Expert commentaries abound. What is remarkable is that 
the events fit very well into the Kuhnian model presented in this paper. It 
was stated earlier that a paradigm is defined by the puzzles it sets out to solve. 
As long as those puzzles remain unanswered, and an answer seems attainable, 
the paradigm will move forward. Charles Glaser's taxonomical questions were 
used as an example of paradigm-defining questions. Given the shakeup in the 
world today, it is useful to look once again at these core questions. (1) Will the 
Soviet Union risk nuclear war to expand?, {2) What assets does the Soviet 
Union value most?, (3) Can the US limit damage to itself in an all out war?, (4) 
What determines advantage between superpowers?, (5) How does the 
difficulty of limiting a war affect deterrence?, and (6) What is required for 
crisis stability? 
This body of questions does not carry the same intensity as it might 
have in the early 1980's. The strategic community is in crisis because the 
questions have changed. Instead of asking if the Soviets will risk war to 
expand, it seems more reasonable to ask, "Who is our enemy?" Instead of 
asking what determines advantage between superpowers, it may make more 
sense to ask, "In a multi-polar, economically diffuse world, does NATO make 
sense any longer?' Instead "f asking about limited nuclear war, perhaps one 
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should ask about nuclear warfare's rea! effects on the ecological 
environment. The discipline is in crisis. The puzzles no longer seem to be 
important. But the new puzzles have not been defined yet. That process has 
started though. Of course the possibility exists that the crisis will be resolved 
within the old paradigm, but most feel that is unlikely. The nature of the "new 
nNmal" (post-revolutionary) science may be around the bend but no one 
knows what the nature of the puzzles, concepts or theories will be. 
H. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
Science, as viewed from the unique and useful weltanschauung angle, 
heralded by Thomas Kuhn, is a process which operates according to a very 
unique dynamic. Concepts and theory are used in order to answer a set of 
questions which are deemed of essential importance by a semi-formalized 
community of thinkers. These concepts and theories are criticized, adjusted, 
manipulated, revised, and replaced by the community after having been 
addressed comprehensively. The body of concepts and theory, and the logical 
tools used to manipulate it in the effort to solve a variety of puzzles, comprise a 
paradigm. Paradigms evolve through criticism. Paradigms can also be 
transformed. They can be come embroiled in crisis as they meet with a 
conceptual or theoretical anomaly which cannot be reconciled within the 
existing worldview. The nuclear strategic community, and its product, nuclear 
strategy, progress in the direction described above. This chapter has 
described how this is so. 
The intent of this chapter has been to demonstrate a remarkable similarity 
between science and the nuclear strategic endeavour. It has not intended to 
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claim that nuclear strategy is a science, only that the strategic process follows 
a similar dynamic to the scientific process. If this basic congruence of science 
and strategy is accepted as, at least, remarkable, then war can be seen as 
scientific, but only insofar as it is relevant in explicating the preparation 
process for war. It should be evident from this chapter and the last that what 
has been described, i. e. the scientific dynamic does not describe the "conduct 
of war." In addressing war's conduct, the argument is brought to a new level, 
a bolder phase of contemplation- that of an and genius. 
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IV. WAR AS ART 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The previous two chapters have concentrated fully on defining a notion of 
science which intuitively runs against the grain of most men's conceptions of 
science. Thomas Kuhn represents the vision of science which is currently 
accepted by the philosophical community as most useful, and best 
substantiated. Though Kuhn has been subjected to much criticism since the 
publication of The Structure of Scienttfic Revolutions, his vision of science is 
well regarded and commented upon throughout the international academy. 
Science, as presented by Kuhn, is a process. To be considered scientific then, 
an endeavour must follow the basic evolutionary dynamic as offered 
previously. The process must reflect evolution as a temporal phenomenon, 
articulation as a quest for coherence. Science is an active process; it always 
strives to explain more. It is a function of Mind primarily, and seeks to attain 
Truth, nominally. In fact, the scientific process will never reveal Truth. 
Perhaps Art, in some esoteric way. does. Still, the Mind ventures forth to 
determine the next best thing, an epistemological coherence which describes 
and explains the world in the simplest, most comprehensive way possible. 
Through a special evolutionary process of, in some sense, 
paradigm is established. 
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The explication of Science and its application to strategy as presented 
previously should elicit at least two major responses from the reader. First, he 
should have a different, hopefully more compelling, view of science than the 
conventional. more Newtonian, conception of science as "product," and 
second, and most important, he should see that the notion of Science as 
presented does not describe the conduct of war very well. An, as the act of 
Man "doing," does describe the conduct of war, and it is this idea of An as 
physical discourse which will drive this section. Most of the path traveled 
thus far- an extensive discussion of Science- has been trodden so as to drive 
home the central idea that the conduct of war is not scientific in any 
important sense and that characteristics inhere in the sublime genius 
different from those of the heroic genius. 
B. THEORETICAL STRUCTURE 
Recall the theoretical breakdown of War into "preparation" and 
"conduct." Science is essential in describing the process of war preparation, 
through strategy formulation, and the entire bureaucratic planning morass. 
Strategy is indeed scientific. It is a community of experts trying to absorb the 
environment and establish a coherent framework for further activity using 
reason and analysis. The process does not stop. It is evolutionary. always 
being articulated further; it is a temporal phenomenon. Science never just 
"is." It is historical. Science is not graphs and charts, equations and 
supercolliders. These artifacts are merely tools used to grease the inner 
workings of an epistemological Juggernaut. 
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The conduct of war does not have Truth or cognitive coherence as its 
goal. It has victory as its goal, a very physical end. And victory, once the 
violence begins, can only come about by disarming the enemy, and ending the 
conflict on favorable terms. The conduct of war does not focus on the role of 
Mind and contemplation, as science does. Instead, it focuses on the role of 
Mind and physical actjon. This is not to say that the great captain in combat is 
not, or cannot be contemplative. He can. Action is not undertaken blindly. 
Action is driven by interest, and constrained by environment. So 
contemplation of these environmental variables certainly does occur. But it 
does so in a manner which is dissimilar to the "coherence-focused" mode of 
scientific thinking. 
Clausewitz' conception of war pivots around what this paper argues is 
the "conduct" of war, as opposed to the preparation for war. As he was 
educated and wrote under the conception of science as preached during the 
Enlightenment, he would likely not be in harmony with the Kuhnian view of 
science as presented in this study. The fact that Clausewitz had a view of 
science different from that of Thomas Kuhn, however, does not negate any 
argument in this study as the thought of Clausewitz is being used primarily to 
demonstrate the more artistic facets of War. 
For the Prussian, war was "an act of force to compel the enemy to do our 
wi 11." 1 0 0 This quotation illustrates two very subtle, yet bold, points. First, 
there is the "act" of force. The conduct of war is just that, an activity which 
has very specific objectives, and myriad techniques. It is, as art is, the 
100 Clausewnz, On War, 75. 
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"doing." The Dictionary of Philosophy and Religion defines an as "any 
purposeful making or doing." 1 0 1 And it is as simple an observation as this 
which often becomes lost in the esoterica of thoughtful analysis. Second, 
there is the idea of compellance of an enemy. The act of war is not a unitary 
burst of self-expression acting upon a passive receptor. War's conduct 
necessarily involves the mutual action of both (or all) belligerents. 
C. GENIUS AND THE CENTRALITY OF MAN 
Yet it seems unsatisfactory to merely state that since the conduct of war is 
an activity, a "doing," it can be classified as an art. Brushing one's teeth or 
driving one's auto are also activities but would not be classified as artistic 
endeavours. Some further distinction needs t:> be made between types of 
activity. It will be argued that art, in its most generic sense, is indeed activity. 
But in the case of the conduct of war, art will transcend &enerjc physical 
action to become more defined in terms of its relation to Genius. Indeed, 
Genius. as a reflection of Man, is the centerpiece of the entire analysis. If Man 
is claimed to be at the center of both the scientific process and the artistic 
enterprise, then it follows that Man and Mind, pushing the limits of creativity 
and originality in both sectors as the agent of Genius, should be the primary 
subject of inquiry. If war is to be classified as art, then it must be conducted by 
an artist. The uniqueness of the artist is his creative genius. Genius is an 
attribute of the human mind; and it is the human mind blessed with genius 
101 Dictionary of Philosophy and Religion, (1980), s. v. "art." 
69 
which is necessary (though not sufficient) for victory in war .I 02 The diagram 
below illustrates this point. 
102 Though genius, in my view. is not quantifiable, its intensity can placed upon some 
sort of continuum however abstract. The actualization of genius is a function of the 
adversity of the environment and the goal desired. While the capable human mind is a 
necessity for victory, the mind imbued with genius as actualized is not. Conditions may 
provide the military commander with overwhelming superiority in numbers and 
technology in which case he would not need to initiate any extraordinary mental dynamic. 

























1. Primacy of action 
(physical 
discourse). 
2. The actual. 
The Place of Man and Genius in War 
It may seem pointless to state once again, in 1991, what Protagoras stated in the 
5th century B. C. • that "Man is the measure of all things," but this very 
central philosophical notion. has transcended time, and done so aggressively. 
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This same idea bas been expanded upon rigourously by Kant in the 18th 
century, applied to the military literature in a way that has not been matched 
since, by Clausewitz in the 19th century, and applied to the once revered 
"bastion of nal knowledge," Science, by Thomas Kuhn, in the 20th century. 
D. THE PRIMARY LESSON OF CLAUSEWITZ 
The most profound proponent of this "military humanism" is without 
question. Carl von Clausewitz. Often called a "Philosopher of War," Clausewitz 
is in fact metaphysically nebulous, a confusing product of his intellectual 
environment. He implicitly synthesizes Scholastic Realism with 
Enlightenment reason flavoring them with an odd application of 
anti-Enlightenment Romantic thought. I 0 3 
German 
But despite this amorphous Clausewitzian metaphysic, the Prussian 's 
masterwork, On War, transcends even the most intense philosophical rigour in 
its central message- the fundamentally profound importance of man's role in 
the conduct of war. To see Clausewitz' most important message as this 
recognition of Man's central role in war, however, is somewhat controversial. 
In fact. this vital humanistic aspect of Clausewitz' thought is often ignored 
when he is addressed in studies about war. 
Indeed. in most military training programs, the only exposure that 
students would receive of Clausewitz is his famous dictum that "War is an 
I 03 I have argued this case in my unpublished NPGS, NS4261 
"Metaphysical Tensions in Clausewitz' On War" of Spring 1991. 
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seminar paper, 
extension of politics by other means." While the connection between politics 
and war is exceedingly important, it is not exactly a novel idea today, nor was 
it profound in the 19th century. In fact, the importance of the politico-
military relationship was revealed by such Classical thinkers as Plato, in his 
Republic, and Aristotle, in his Politics. Machiavelli was amongst the first to 
further define and elucidate the connection. Felix Gilbert notes, 
Machiavelli is usually held to have introduced a new era, the modem 
era, in the development of political tbought...lt hardly goes too far to say 
that Machiavelli became a political thinker because he was a military 
thinker. His view of the military problems of his time patterned his 
entire political outlook. I 04 
Another example involves the Prussian General Friederich Constantin 
von Lossau, who, in his War, of 1815, two years before Clausewitz began to put 
On War to paper. stated, "Wars are therefore the exterior means of states to 
achieve by violence what they cannot achieve by peaceful means."l 05 It 
should be evident that Clausewitz' dictum may borrow heavily from Lossau 's 
articulation of a very similar idea, though the causal connection between the 
thoughts of the two men cannot be proven here. In tenns of the politico-
military relationship, it is very possible that Clausewitz can best be seen as a 
refiner and explicator rather than as a profound innovator. 
For military thinkers of the present day, Clausewitz' gift should be 
thought of as his vision of the role of Man in war. It could rightly be thought 
104 Felix Gilbert, Makers of Modern Strategy: from Kachiavelli to the Nuclear Age, ed. 
Peter Paret, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986), 11. 
105 Friderich Constantin von Lossau, cited in Azar Gat, The Origins of Military Thought: 
From The Enlightenment To Clausewitz.(Oxford, England: Clarendon Press, 1989), 242. 
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of as his most important, profound, and relevant avenue of inquiry. It opens 
up a new arena of intellectual exploration. 
Yet it would still be unrealistic to think that Clausewitz was the first to 
recognize the role of Man in war. Most all military thinkers, both mainstream 
and arcane, have recognized the importance of the human element in war, yet 
only Clausewitz sta!1ds out as 1h..c.. premier military thinker of the last 200 
years. Why? Why has the thought of Henri Jomini waned in influence, and 
that of Clausewitz thrived? The answer is simple. Despite the fact that 
Clausewitz lived 170 years ago, his thought process, and expression in prose 
fits remarkably well within the intellectual, and phil<'sophical framework of 
the Western world today, especially the United States. 
While many philosphical splinter groups are constantly attempting to 
articulate their views and spread the word to those willing to receive, 
mainstream Western philosophy may be best seen as a blend of American 
Pragmatism. Cartesian Rationalism, and neo-Kantianism.l 06 The core point is 
a recognition that know'edge has very defined limits. All knowledge is a 
product of Mind. and while great consensus exists amongst thinkers, Absolutes 
c'"nnot be demonstrated with certainty. Man is the bounding element in 
intellectual inquiry. Truth is not denied, but it is not claimed with any great 
intensity either. In other words there are limits to what can be described, 
explained and predicted. Clausewitz recognized this fact as it concerns War 
and what can be known about it. His theory of war recognizes this 
106 This statement alone is the stuff of more thesis topics. I do not attempt to prove this 
point as it is a bit out of this paper's purview. 
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fundamental Jimitatio?<, and synthesizes it with War's observables, and other 
important conceptual entities. 
Theory is thought by most scholars either to (1) describe, (2) explain, 
or (3) predict. Descriptive theory is the least complex of the three, and 
answers the "What?" question. The explanatory theory attempts to answer the 
"Why?" question, and involves a level of inquiry beyond mere decription. The 
dynamics of an event or phenomena must be reconciled within a theory of 
causality which ir volves the focus of exploration. Predictive theory is the 
most difficult to get a firm grip on. This type of theory assumes absolutes. 
The ancient Egyptian predictions of the Nile River's ebb and flow were indeed 
accurate, bu. they assumed that because the river behaved in a particular way 
in the past, it woJid behave that way in the future as well. This is of course, 
logically fallacious. I 07 
Jomini failed to establish the intellectual longevity of a Clausewitz 
because he fa:kJ iu recognize the limits of what a theory of war can do. 
Theory that involves the natural sciences, while subject to the same logical 
rules as any other the or::. allows more accurate prediction because 
subjectivity can be minimized. Theories that involve the ministrations of 
humans are notoriously unreliable in terms of prediction. Jomini did not 
recognize the role of man as such a variable and potentially disruptive 
theoretical entity. He sought to extract absolute laws of war inductively from 
!listorical analyses of the Napoleonic battles and claim their immutability 
107 This is an application of the well-known "problem of induction" as articulated by the 
Scottish philosopher David Hume in his An Inquiry Concerning Human Understanding 
(1748). 
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through all places and times. He articulated rules and laws. Clausewitz allowed 
for transcendence thereof. Azar Gat notes that, 
Jomini claimed to have revealed the principles of Napoleonic warfare 
which were at the same time also the universal principles of the an of 
war. This double staus was based on the belief that Napoleon's genius 
actually embodied the universal principles of war.l 0 8 
This passage reveals the fundamental difference in the competing thoughts of 
Jomini and Clausewitz. For Jomini, Genius (Man), in this case Napoleon, could 
not transcend the absolute laws of war. Genius could only attain to and 
ultimately become one with the Absolute. Jomini recognized the limits of 
human discourse. and it was the Absolute. 
Clausewitz saw through the Jominian absurdity of absolutes in war, and 
did not provide for any great predictive potential in his theory. He 
recognized the limits of what could be said of war, because he recognized the 
limits of what could be said of Man. And this recognition of limitation, and the 
profundity of seeing that the existence of Man in war gave rise to this 
limitation, allows Clausewitz to be revered in the present day. Clausewitz, as 
shall be shown, did not recognize the Absolute as a viable metaphysical 
entity,I09 and thus Mind defined its own limitations, and could transcend any 
supposedly absolute laws of war. 
108 Gat, 119. 
I 09 Again. sec my "Metaphysical Tensions ... " 
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E. CLAUSEWITZ ON ART AND WAR 
Art in war is a manifestation and application of heroic genius, as opposed 
to the application of sublime genius, the latter being most apparent in science. 
It is important to note before continuing that an exploration of art in war is in 
no way leading to a proclamation that war is in some way, "beautiful." The 
study of beauty is best left to the aesthetician. To speak of art in the context of 
war is merely to speak of the physical dynamic of human creativity. 
Clausewitz begins his chapter, "Art of War or Science of War," by 
attempting to classify war. He does so by first specifying his terms as follows: 
... caJI everything ·•art" whose object is creative ability, as, for 
instance, architecture. The term "science" should be kept for disciplines 
such as mathematics or astronomy, whose object is pure knowledge. I 1 0 
He goes on to assert that war is more art than it is science but that it cannot be 
considered a pure art, for example: 
The essential difference is that war is not an exercise of the will 
directed at inanimate matter, as is the case with the mechanical arts, or at 
matter which is animate but passive and yielding, as is the case with the 
human mind and emotions in the fine arts. In war, the will is directed at 
an animate object that reacts .111 
It follows then that for Clausewitz, war is a quasi-art. This is an 
unfortunate condition because Clausewitz is using the criteria that art must 
110 Clausewitz, On War, 148. It is critical to note that the Clausewitzian conception of 
science is not congruent with the Kuhnian notion of science as described in depth 
previous I y. 
I I I Ibid. 149. 
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involve matter which is "inanimate" or "passive and unyielding." War is not 
a true an for Clausewitz because war involves an animate object which reacts-
the enemy. In this sense war is speciaL But what Clausewitz does not mention 
is that the reactive subject of creativity, in the case of war, the opposing army, 
enhances the need for actualization of the commander's Genius. In some way, 
the violence and ambiguity of war requires a talent far beyond the 
manipulation of a willing, passive, medium. War is in some sense Dl..2U. artistic 
then, than the so called normal ans. I doubt that Clausewitz would find great 
fault in this statement. 
War necessarily requires creative ability; it requires an exercise of the 
will. Paret cites an undated Clausewitz essay, "On Art and Theory of Art," that 
illustrates the possible link between an and war in the following: 
Thus art is a developed [ausgebildete] capacity. If it is to express itself 
it must have a purpose, like every application of existing forces, and to 
approach this purpose it is necessary to hav.~ a means. . .. To combine 
purpose and means is to create. An is the capacity to create .. .ll 2 
Art has purpose. Art is the application of force. An requires a means. Though 
war is not mentioned here specifically, it is simple to see the bold application 
of this passage. War has a purpose, requires the application of forces, and 
requires a means. 
For Clausewitz, genius "refers to a highly developed mental aptitude for 
a particular occupation:·ll 3 This is a very pragmatic basic definition. 
112 Clausewitz, "Uber Kunst und Kunsttheorie," Geist und Tat, cited in Paret, C lausewitz 
and the State, 163. 
113 Clausewitz, On War, 100. 
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Though it is not embellished with the linguistic sturm und drang 
transcendental flourishes of the day, it bears an interestingly close 
resemblance to Immanuel Kant's definition as articulated in his Critique of 
Judgement. For Kant, 
Genius is the innate mental disposition (ingenium) through which 
Nature gives rule to Art .... [lt is] a talent for producing that for which no 
definite rule can be given; it is not a mere aptitude for what can be 
learnt by a rule. Hence originality must be its first property ... .114 
Kant, the father and founder of German critical idealism is here laying the 
groundwork to a conception of art and genius which is to be later articulated 
much in parallel by the soldier Clausewitz. 
Military genius, of course is the concentration of Clausewitz's efforts in 
On War. He claims that the generic "genius" of the philosophers is not useful 
in practice since it describes only a superlative degree of talent and has no 
measurable limits . Military genius involves, 
... all those gifts of mind or temperament that in combination bear on 
military activity .... Genius consists in a harmonius combination of elements, 
in which on~~ or the other ability may predominate, but none may be in 
conflict with Ltle rest. I 1 5 
Given the focus of this paper, it is necessary to reflect briefly upon levels of 
genius in War. It would seem, from a purely theoretical angle, that Genius 
could occur at any level of a conflict. It can occur at the supreme 
commander's level as well as the level of the platoon commander. Historically, 
114 Immanuel Kant. Critique of Judgement, cited in Ernst Cassirer, An Essay On Man: An 
Introduction to a Philosophy of Human Culture ( New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 
1944), 227. 
115 Clausewitz, On War, 100. 
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studies of military Genius have addressed those men who have exercised action 
which could affect the outcome of the campaign, 116 men such as as Hannibal, 
Napoleon, and Manstein. Of course it also needs to be recognized that in 
addressing the Genius in battle, one cannot ignore the potential for intense, 
situation-driven excellence at the tactical level. 
In a chapter entitled "Moral Factors 11 1," Clausewitz asserts that the 
moral elements of 1. skill of the commander, 2. experience and courage of the 
troops, and 3. their patriotic spirit, are among the most important in war. He 
realizes the utter impredictability of any synthesis of these elements and the 
fact that in combination they can lead to victory or defeat just as easily. This 
message is Clausewitz at his pithiest and most sublime. 
Clausewitz recognizes that little has ever been written formally by 
strategists or military historians regarding the dynamic of moral force.ll 8 
He ;;ays, 
116 Conversations with Professor R. H. S. Stolfi, 16 October 1991. It should be noted 
here as well that "genius" as used in much of this paper is simply generic intellectual 
capability. All humans have a level of genius as measured on some esoteric qualitative 
scale. Napoleon would score exceedingly high, a mongoloid would score incredibly low. 
The important subject of analysis is genius actualized in a certain manner, and the 
understanding of how that is so. 
117 Clausewitz, On War, 184. 
118 Raymond Aron, C/ausewitz: Philosopher of War (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice 
Hall, 1985), 117, and Liddell Hart, Strategy (Frederick A. Praeger, 1968), 353, both 
praise Clausewitz for his reco~nition of the importance of the moral/psychological forces 
in war. Aron integrates the moral forces into a book which is itself constructed in a 
very Hegelian manner. Hart lambasts Clausewitz for the most part but does concede the 
Pruss ian's utility at least in so far as the human element is an important factor. 
80 
.. .it is paltry philosophy if in the old fashioned way one lays down 
rules and principles in total disregard of moral values. As soon as these 
[moral values} appear one regards them as exceptions, which gives them 
a cenain scientific status, and thus makes them into rules. Or again one 
may appeal to genius, which is above all rules; which amounts to 
admitting that rules are not only made for idiots, but are idiotic in 
themselves.119 
He seems to be saying that the only rule is that the implied grand, 
intellectually inspired rules are for idiots and are idiotic. He does not relegate 
war to the realm of utter chaos however. He recognizes, in prime Kantian 
fashion, that Genius lives above any rules or absolutes, and that the moral 
factors, functions of the inherently chaotic, ye: high energy ambiguities of 
Mind, often change the rules in any case. 
The German Army, esteemed purveyor of manial excellence, recognized 
this Clausewitzian and Kantian tenet. In a publication from the US Army War 
College regarding German Army War Games, Generaloberst Franz Halder 
states. 
Contemporary military literature included unofficial manuals 
concerning the organization and direction of Kriegsspiele. In order 
to avoid even the slightest semblance of regimentation and to maintain 
full freedom in the application and the development of the war game, no 
instructions of this kind were issued l'y official sources. 1 2 0 
This passage clearly illustrates the German emphasis on the commander's 
freedom on the battlefield. The German Army bred event-making men prior 
to WW 11. It recognized the profundity of the Clausewitzian legacy of Man's 
119 Clausewitz, On War, 184. 
120 Generaloberst Franz Halder. "German Army War Games," Art of War Colloquium, 
(Carlisle Barracks, PA: US Army War College, 1983), ix. 
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centrality in war, and the limitlessness of his Mind when subject to the chaos 
of the situation. The Germans bred doers. 
Katherine Herbig, in her essay, "Chance and Uncenainty in On War, .. 
cites Clausewitz as he speaks of war's largely entropic--disorderly, bordering 
on chaotic- tendencies. Her discussion is presented here as an example of how 
not to think about Clausewitz' lesson: 
War is more than a true chameleon that slightly adapts its 
characteristics to a given case. As a total phenomenon its dominant 
tendencies always make war a rerr.:ukable trinity-composed of primordial 
violence, hatred, and enmity, which are to be regarded as a blind natural 
force; of the play of chance and probability within which the creative 
spirit is free to roam; and of its element of subordination, as an 
instrument of policy, which makes it subject to reason alone.l 2 1 
She claims that "If war is one pan passion, one pan chance, and one part 
reason, then the two of the three elements in its nature are by definition 
wanton, even uncoiltrollable ... 122 Herbig then goes on in her piece to 
pessimistically describe the primacy and pervasiveness of chance in war and 
of the fact that "we must assign to man's frail reason the remaining one 
third."123 
This view of man's role in war is one that at once infuriates and 
inspires the bolder and most astute readers. Given Clausewitz 's vision of 
genius, Herbig misses the point by eQuatjn~ the three elements of passion, 
chance and reason. Reason, a tool of genius, is the element with primacy in 
121 Clausewitz, On War, 89. 
122 Katherine L. Herbig. Clausewitz and Modern Strategy , ed. Michael I. Handel, (Totowa, 
NJ: Frank Cass and Company Limited, 1986), 97. 
123 Ibid. . 115. 
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war. Chance certainly is pervasive; but it is, as Clausewitz said, where "the 
creative spirit is free to roam." Genius controls reason, and channels non-
rational energies. It "roams" in the domain of chance in order to reign it in 
and achieve victory. Clausewitz is in celebration of the man, he does not 
subordinate man's role to the dictate of chance. He recognizes the difficulties 
presented by chance, uncertainty and friction, but does not equate their 
presence in a situation with futility. The intangibles are pervasive, and thus 
the qualitative effects will always have the potential for heroic influence. 
The highly regarded philosopher and humanist Sir Isaiah Berlin offers 
an idea which seems appropriate in looking generally at the idea of An, and 
further, usefully applies the Kantian and Clausewitzian idea that Genius 
dominates the Absolute. 
When an artist is engaged in creating a work of art, he does not, 
despite naive views to the contrary, transcribe from me pre-existent 
model. .. the song is what I compose or sing when I compose or sing it, not 
something independent of my activity; creation is not an attempt to copy 
some already given, fixed, eternal. Platonic pattern. Only craftsmen 
copy: artists create.l24 
Examples abound of soldiers, as artists, creating. Though genius as the 
act of creation in war is not quantifiable, it most certainly can be placed on 
an abstract. intuitive continuum. Genius may preside in one person, or, 
genius as demonstrated by one person, may vary over time as a function of the 
contingency which causes that genius to actualize itself. This latter case is 
embodied by Napoleon Bonaparte. 
124 Isaiah Berlin, The Crooked Timber of Humanity: Chapters in the History of Ideas, 
(New York, NY: Alfred A. Knopf. 1990), 188. 
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Certainly, by most accounts, Napoleon was a military genius. This is to 
say fundamentally that the potential for the actualization of some level of a 
vast potential of intellectual power is everpresent. The level of genius 
exercised within any given situation is a function of the holistic sum of 
elements in that contingency. The artist in war, as creator, is not operating 
upon a passive medium. He is attempting to create, to form in clay if you will, 
a victory. But the clay, to take the metaphor a bit further, is unwilling, at 
some level, to be formed. The genius of the commander must rein in the 
enemy, to control the clay so that he is able to shape it into whatever form he 
desires. Every contingency offers the commander a different medium, and so 
the degree of genius to be exercised by the commander will change. 
Often thought of as Napoleon's greatest victory, the Battle of Austerlitz 
embodies Napoleonic genius at its classical best. Outnumbered 82,500 Austrians 
and Russians to 65,000 French, Napoleon still managed to bring about victory 
in grand style. Napoleon surveyed the strategic environment holistically, 
came to terms with the situation, and acted aggressively and quickly. He 
succeeded in keeping apart the full strength of an Austro-Prussian coalition 
by boldly attacking into the heart of Austria. He realized that if his force met 
with the concentrated entire Austro-Russian forces head-on the advantage in 
numerical strength held by his opponents would be overwhelming. But by 
keeping his enemy divided, Napoleon had the ability to realize victory 
through superior command and control and bold initiative. And, of course, he 
did. 125 The key is that the level of Napoleon's genius was contingent upon his 
1 2 5 Historical review taken primarily from lecture notes given by Professor R. H. S. 
Stolfi, 10 Jan 91 at The Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA. Also helpful was 
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strategic environment. The environment does not constrain genibs; it only 
defines the level of actualization. 
The recent U. S. Operation Desert Storm is also an example of a degree of 
genius actualized, though this level of actualization is far below that of 
Napoleon as expressed on a qualitative continuum. General Norman 
Schwarzkopf without question led the United States and coalition forces to a 
great victory. or better put, an easy victory. The medium of Schwarzkopf's 
creation, or artistry seemed to be a willing one. The Iraqi forces did not offer 
any effective resistance in combat, nor did they display any significant 
degree of elan or initiative prior to hostilities. Though it could be argued that 
the execution of potent air strikes upon the enemy's positions prior to the 
commencement of the ground war demoralized the opposing army. thus 
breaking its will. there is a high probability that the Iraqi army was not 
sufficiently motivated to fight effectively ir. the first place. Schwarzkopf 
formed his clay. but one might question the fundamental nature of the clay he 
fom1cd. The bottom line is simply that the level of genius necessary to win 
Desert Storm was not too high. This is not meant to trivialize the efforts of the 
men involved in the operation, only to demonstrate the variable role of the 
extraordinary intellect in war. 
The more difficult the situation, the more genius is required to 
overcome the difficulties. The United States • because of its tremendous 
economic and political power. may not need to gain victory through the work 
of extraordinary genius in the future. Basic, solid intellectual capacity will 
material from Russel F. Weigley, The Age of Battles: The Quest for Decisive Warfare from 
Breiten/eld to Waterloo, Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1991), 384-390. 
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likely suffice. The United States will drive the problem so that it is not in a 
situation at the outset of hostilities which would put it at an initial 
disadvantage, either qualitative or quantitative. But to reiterate, as genius is 
an attribute of man, and men alone are the creatures who take pan in war, 
genius will always be a pan of the equation. An is the doing of men. Genius is 
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V. CONCLUSION 
What is War? Is it an art or a science? Is it something that somehow 
synthesizes the two? Is this an important question? These queries have been 
guiding this paper from the outset. But the emotions that have been giving 
energy to the the rationale are entirely different. The importance of Man in 
life and consequently, in War, seems to be in the process of becoming 
trivialized. A vitalistic, holistic view of life which has been celebratory of 
Man. has given way to a mechanistic, unimpassioned secularism. The part 
played in life by passion and emotion seems no longer to be as significant as it 
once was. Science no longer is equated with man's search for Truth. Instead, 
science is equ::~ted, tragically, and mistaken y, with its own artifacts. Si:lce 
technology has played such a great part in all wars, and technological 
advances have given certain types of advantage to the innovators, it has come 
to fi II the eye of the public and the military community. Science, as an 
institution is implicitly being eQuated with technological artifacts, and this 1s 
a grave error. Since technology is much in the public eye in terms of its 
military applications, especially after the recent Desert Storm operation, 
people are continuously calling War "scientific" because it involves state of 
the craft technology. This is absurd. Science is not an artifact, a thing; it is a 
unique process. 
Art also is considered by most in the Western •·· .ald to be defined in 
terms of its own artifacts a~ well. The role of Man in the scientific and anistic 
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endeavours has been ignored. One of the primary results of this paper, in a 
very broad sense, bas been the re-revelation that Man is indeed, the driver of 
both Science and Art, that Man is the "rider" and the anifacts are the 
"horse." This point alone is a weighty message for the military officer to 
ponder, but the paper continues to show how this humanistic edge applies to 
War. 
War, as defined today, encompasses so many tangential considerations 
that it has become useless as a descriptive term. As a result, a theoretical 
breakdown which would facilitate discussion had to be made. The broad notion 
of War was broken down into two separate branches- conduct of war and 
preparatiGns for war. Preparations for war, which include such activities as 
strategic planning, programming and budgeting, congressional liaison, 
weapons procurement, training and the like are before the fact, before the 
Clausewitzian "cash transaction" of battle. They represent the "potential" in 
contrast to the "actual" of combat. Preparing for war is akin to the scientific 
dynamic. lt is historical, and seeks to find the "right" way, or "best" way to do 
a certain thing. lt displays the primacy of sublime genius, the genius of the 
scientific process. Indeed, war preparation is driven by the Man and Mind, 
but it reflects a special kind of work done by a special kind of mind. 
Similarly. the conduct of war requires a special kind of genius as well. 
Instead of the primacy of sublime contemplation however, the conduct of war 





physical action, or "event-making" action.12 6 To restate the fundamental 
point, "An is doing." 
In an 1st prize award winning essay (the Air University's Ira C. Eaker 
Award). LTC Dennis Drew states that the military art, 
... is discovered through the study of military history ... the study of 
military history provides insight into the evolutior. of strategic thought, 
the political and military objectives of warfare, the influence of 
technology on operational concepts ... Thus the intelligent study of 
military history can provide a fundamental understanding of strategy, 
tactics, doctrine, political military relations, and leadership. Such are the 
elements of the military an.12 7 
This passage is indicative of the confusion which permeates the defense-
intellectual community. These "elements of military art," as presented by 
Drew. with the exception of leadership, encompass an overly broad set of 
subjects which are in fact, wittin the framework of the theory presented in 
this paper. best considered under the rubric, Science. Indeed military history 
is and should be a critical focus of intellectual energy for any military man. 
History helps to reveal the chance, uncenainty, and friction which was met 
by the speci fie commander in the specific situation. No absolutes should be 
drawn from history, only examples of the Mind's relationship to both the 
tang1bles and intangibles of a given situation. History can be used 
scientifically in attempting to better articulate a paradigm through the 
126 The conception of a hero as an event-making man is borrowed from Siodney Hook as 
articulated in his The Hero In History: A Study of Limitation and Possibility, (Boston, 
MA: Beacon Press, 1943 ). 
127 LTC Dennis M. Drew, "Military Att and the American Tradition: The VietNam 
P1radox Revisited,'' Air UniverSity Review , (Jan-Feb 1983). 
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corroboration or falsification of theory, but it does not reveal the elements of 
art. Art is the doing, not studying the "done." 
Man is a curious beast. The Mind of Man, gifted with consciousness, is 
an infinitely faceted jewel. Mind gives direction, Mind controls action, Mind 
defines character and personality, and Mind may allow for the actualization of 
Genius. War is an Art and Science because both require Mind for their 
art i c u 1 at i on . 
Yet at a more focused level, war must be discussed in terms of its conduct 
and its preparation. In doing this, the common link of Mind and Genius can be 
further specified. Those who prepare for war are exercising the sublime 
mind. They are the thinkers and planners, detached and free from the passion 
of combat. Those men who conduct war are the doers, men that recognize the 
inherent intangibles in 
accomplish their tasks. 
war, and that rise above them actively in order to 
They are exercising the heroic mind. They witness 
the passion of combat and channel that energy to advantage. 
That the defense institution involves two very different types of minds 
is no small message, though this fact has been implicitly known and accepted 
for years. This paper should help to understand better the relationships to be 
cultivated between scientific and artistic intellects. 
More disturbing messages, however, are revealed upon further 
speculation. The question arises in looking at the training program set by 
each branch of the service: what kind of man is being trained for war? When 
training is looked at holistically, the services seem to be breeding preparers; 
perhaps more intellectual energy should be expended in finding ways to 







war. And once identified, how are the war fighters trained? It is apparent that 
preparers have been well trained by a U. S. armed forces educational system 
with a cant in the direction of teaching officers about things, e. g. , plans, 
weapons, schedules, etc. But war fighters must undergo a different son of 
training. If the war fighting soldiers of the future are to be event-making 
men who live and breathe beyond the rules they must be trained to let the 
mind roam free, to become exposed to the heady world of consciousness 
through reading and criticizing the masterworks and esoterica of philosophy, 
religion, history, and the like. If the Genius in battle is to live above the so-
called absolutes in war (the "rules"), a!'d exhibit characteristics of "creativity 
and originality to the highest power," then the soldier must be placed in an 
environment where he is compelled to do so. 
Men of war need to be men of action. Action in war must be guided by a 
fundamental recognition and assimilation of all facets of the martial 
environment. Men of war are decisionmakers. Decisions must be made 
rapidly, and all implications thereof need to be recognized and addressed. Of 
course, not all decisions are simple ones. In order to decide boldly, the soldier 
must be able to, in an instant, manipulate, adjust, correct for, and/or ignore 
the myriad variables in war which are driven by chance and uncenainty. 
These variables run a range from the moral and physical disposition of one's 
forces and those of the enemy, to the weather, to the integrity of the logistics 
train. The capability to identify these discrete variables and manipulate them 
individually or in toto is derived from the flexible mind. The intellectual 
flexibility of the soldier must be a number one priority. This is achieved by 




student to answer why the ideas are considered new and different, and if the 
answers represent valid conclusions. The critical mind is a flexible mind. A 
flexible mind is the mind for battle. For example, rather than asking a student 
to explain why the Germans lost WWII, ask him to comment upon why the 
Germans should have won the war in grand style. Rather than reading 
Clausewitz and rehashing the importance of his "famous" dictum, read 
Clausewitz and Hegel, then write about the similarity in style of argument. 
The possibilities are limitless. This type of training should occur at every 
level of the soldier's career, especially at the early stages. Changes are often 
made in organizations by the very new, and the very junior. 
One can only imagine the effect that an introduction to William of 
Ockham, the 14th century churchman, would have upon the defense 
establishment. "Ockham's Razor," the age old principle of parsimony which 
said "Metaphysical entities are not to multiplied beyond necessity," would 
have profound effects upon a military with swollen staffs that create 
extraneous issues and shield general officers from direct contact with 
subordinate commanders. The problem is that the United States is the land of 
the current and fashionable. How can a medievel theologian be important to 
ComCarGru 2? He can, if believed to be important. 
But intellectual excellence and a flexible mental capacity are only part 
of the requirements of a heroic genius. Excellence in physical operations 
must also be strived for. Real time, pressure-filled exercises must be conducted 
and decisions must be made. Men must be held accountable for these decisions. 






All decisionmakers must be forced to analyze their actions in more honest, 
intense and fundamental ways. 
War requires two types of men- thinkers and doers. The relationship is 
symbiotic, but the errphasis must be placed on the latter. The thinkers support 
the doers. Preparations support the activity. If war is to be thought of as so 
broad as to include all of the aspects discussed previously, then indeed war can 
be classified as art and science. But if war is to be addressed in its most 
fundamental sense, as "an act of force to compel the enemy to do our will," as 
Clausewitz states, then it most certainly is an art. 
and inspiration. Soldiers are men, and thus 
Men are creatures of passion 
are a synthesis of passion, 
inspiration and reason, sometimes coldly critical in their thought, at times 
fiercely chaotic. War is a product of men, a product which is not beautiful, yet 
oddly, perhaps inevitable and intensely passionate . Men bring with them to 
war, the same energies which guide their lives. The soldier-genius recognizes 
the potential en trophy and acts to deal with it, and ultimately achieve victory. 
As a Rafael represents a vision on canvas, a Napoleon, with broad sweeps of a 
brush, also actualizes a vision. 
The results of this paper are not particularly revolutionary, but 
reaching them has been intensely edifying for the writer. Intellectual 
history is a fascinating subject, and though this paper did not deal specifically 
with that topic, the messages contained herein must be considered in its 
intellectual context, just as the thinkers' addressed above need to be. As stated 
in the introduction, it is this writer's view that certain philosophical trends 
took the intellectual energy away from mainstream America and refocused it 
upon a materialist, pseudo-progressive ideal, rather than an intellectual one . 
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The tools of business management have made their way over to the military 
and have anesthetized organizations which should thrive on passion. Now 
America is a rich nation but does not know where to go next. One pan of this 
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